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Abstract. This paper provides a general framework for the supply side when a firm employing multiple workers faces
convex search friction. It also provides analytical scheme for non-steady states. Convex search friction makes the path
outside of unbounded steady states possess greater significance than mere transition, since any level of output can be
supported as a steady state equilibrium depending on the state of expectation. The marginal profit value of labor is
always strictly positive, which results in persistent excess demand in the labor market as well as excess supply in the
goods market. However, the fact that convex search friction makes immediate adjustment of employment suboptimal
induces further hiring to depend on coordination of expectation. It raises non-market-clearing equilibrium in terms of
long-run without price- nor wage-rigidity in competitive markets.
1. Introduction
The present paper studies optimal employment policy of a firm operating in a frictional labor market in which
friction is representable by a convex vacancy cost function, and studies its implication on employment distribution
and market equilibrium. In generalizing a matching model from one-to-one to one-to-many, it is natural, or even
necessary, to assume a convex vacancy cost function —a function which literally relates number of job vacancy
posting to the cost. The existence of friction make it inevitable to use internal resources to hire workers so that it
causes congestion over those resources. Search friction inherently arises from heterogeneity in undocumentable
properties of workers or firms. Any friction attributable to documentable properties can be part of friction, but
it is easily eliminated with information technology to a negligible level. As such, selection of workers requires
tacit knowing by insiders, and therefore, if a firm intends to increase number of hiring, the accompanying cost
should exhibit more than linear increase as any kinds of adjustment cost do (Uzawa (1969), Yashiv (2000, 2006)).
Yashiv (2000) shows that empirical hiring cost function is highly convex in terms of weighted average of posted
vacancy and actual hiring. Moreover, convexity in the vacancy cost function is supported from the fact that it
is the only class robust against small perturbations on functional form, the derivative of which is monotone and
which does not diverge in equilibrium. Requirement of robustness would be natural, because there is no logically
Date: December, 2009.
Key words and phrases. non-steady state analysis, convex search friction, wage bargaining, optimal non-market clearing economy.
It was previously circulated under the title “Employment Policy of a Firm Under the Presence of Search Friction”. The author would greatly
appreciate useful comments by Haruo Imai, Ryoichi Imai, Akira Kawaguchi, Keiichiro Kobayashi, Masataka Kudo, Hiromi Nosaka, Yoshiaki
Omori, Tsunao Okumura, Soichi Ota, Fumio Otake, Nobusumi Sagara, Toyotaka Sakai, Masaru Sasaki, Tadashi Sekiguchi, Akihisa Shibata,
Toshiaki Tachibanaki, Makoto Watanabe and audience of Kansai Labor Seminar, Summer Workshop on Economic Theory, Search Theory
Conference in Osaka, Pacific Rim Conference 2009 of Western Economic Association International, 2009 Far East and South Asia Meeting
of Econometric Society and seminars at Keio University, Kyoto Institute for Economic Research, Osaka University and Yokohama National
University. Any remaining mistakes should be attributed to the author.
JEL classification: C61, C71, C78, D21, D24, E24, J64.
1
PRODUCTION THEORY WITH CONVEX LABOR FRICTION 2
strong, a priori reason that the vacancy cost function must have a particular functional form. For an analysis to be
applicable to actual economies, it must be based on robust assumptions.
It will be shown that the marginal wage cost value determined by bargaining is always strictly smaller than
the marginal production value of labor as far as employment is below the unbounded steady state. On the other
hand, the optimal employment policy under the convex vacancy cost function does not allow the path to jump
to the unbounded steady state. This is in contrast to the linear vacancy cost case of Smith (1999). Any firm is
willing to accommodate all the demand directed to it at any moment. However, investment decision on hiring
cost depends on the expected demand in the next moment which is contingent on the action of other firms. For an
economy to converge to the unbounded steady state, agents must share dynamically persistent common knowledge
that the economy ultimately reaches to that state. Once agents become to believe that demand is already satiated,
strategy to make additional employment becomes suboptimal, and thus demand will not actually grow. This
brings the same implication as non-market-clearing (NMC) approach by Barro and Grossman (1976) on rational
basis with flexible prices. Flexible prices will eliminate temporary disequilibrium but not the state of long-run
disequilibrium that arises from the degree of coordination. The model presented in this paper is a generalization
of the Mortensen-Pissarides model which assumes that production is undertaken by a pair of a worker and a job.
The Mortensen-Pissarides model can be interpreted that it assumes that the “firm” employing multiple workers is
decomposable to independent units of jobs. Its assumption of constant vacancy cost is literally hypothesizing a
linear vacancy cost function. It assumes that the size of employment in the economy is determined by the entry
condition that the value of vacancy equals zero, together with the assumption that each production pair always
successfully earns constant income. However, it is not guaranteed that the level of employment this condition
requires is not so huge that it exceeds the existing population. At the unbounded steady state, we should observe
that potential entrepreneurs cease job posting simply because labor market tightness makes the waiting time for
arrival of workers too long compared to vacancy cost. However, such behavior can be observed, if any, only in
the acme of economic boom. The existence of free public intermediaries and the fact that vacancy cost should
decline as market tightness increases enforce the view that the required employment is too high. The decrease of
vacancy cost is due to the decrease of applicants that a particular firm receives requiring less cost for interview and
selection activities. Also, linear hiring cost implicitly assumes that hiring activities do not consume any internal
resources. Namely, the selection process must be trivial so that it simply does not exist or it is outsourced. In the
former case, search friction due to heterogeneity of agents will not exist. The latter case implies that all properties
related to worker selection must be describable to delegate the selection.
Section 2 summarizes the structure of the model. Section 3 studies how the value of unemployment, the
threat point in wage bargaining, is determined. Section 4 studies the outcome of wage bargaining. It is shown that
integral equation is useful to solve non-stationary value functions. Section 5 studies the firm’s optimal employment
behavior. Section 6 rationalizes the assumptions made in section 3 are actually consistent with the whole model.
Section 7 analyzes the behavior on the demand constraint when the constraint is stationary. Section 8 delivers some
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implication on interest rates, which might resolve the allocation paradox. Section 9 provides some concluding
remarks.
2. TheModel
2.1. Firm. A competitive firm under the presence of search friction in the labor market is considered. The number
of firms is continuous with fixed measure one.1 Namely, one particular firm has continuously small measure.
Therefore, the change in the supply of the firm cannot affect aggregate supply, resulting not only in unchanged
prices but also in unchanged aggregate income. There are two goods in the economy: output goods and various
types of labor. Output goods is taken to be numeraire and labor is heterogeneous with unknown properties so that
optimal search behavior of a firm is not trivial. A firm uses multiple workers of potentially different types. Types of
workers can be categorized into two classes, declarable types and non-declarable ones. The former is the properties
that can be prescribed as hiring requirements, such as possession of driver’s license and academic background. The
latter is the attributes that cannot be documented. Therefore, they are only revealed after having an interview with
workers. Personality or suitability to particular corporate culture falls in this category. The notion of quality of
match is also covered by this concept as far as it is revealed immediately. Non-declarable types are assumed to be
matching-specific. Worker types are expressed by a combination of declarable and non-declarable types, therefore
let bundle (i, j) denote a worker type with declarable type i ∈ {1, . . . , L} and non-declarable type j ∈ {1, . . . , Mi}.
Different types are clearly distinguished from each other. Workers are assumed to be unable to choose their types
to abstract the effect of education and training. Same type of workers are homogeneous. Production function
of a firm is given by f (l) where l = (l1, . . . , lL) and li = (li1, . . . , liMi ) are vectors of employment such that li j
is employment of (i, j)-type worker, ∂ f /∂li j > 0 and f is concave. We also assume Inada condition around the
origin: ∂ f /∂li j → +∞ as li j → 0.
Since labor market is frictional, a firm cannot adjust employment stock directly. It can only adjust inflow to and
outflow from the stock. For the inflow, the firm decides how much internal resources to spend on recruiting workers
in the labor market to adjust employment. After the choice of the level of recruiting activities m = (m1, . . . ,mL) for
each declarable type, it would observe a variety of applicants to arrive stochastically.2 A matching session proceeds
in a way that firms post job advertisement first and workers apply to a preferred job. Such a matching mechanism
1It should be emphasized that this is not assuming away free-entry to get the results obtained in this paper. The reason that this condition
is required is that, 1) a vacancy cost function with no fixed cost, 2) variable measure of firms and 3) the production economy simply cannot
coexist. Once we allow variable measure of firms, infinite number of firms employing no workers is created, leading to zero production (not
indeterminate, see arguments below). To describe production economy, either 1) or 2) must be discarded.
The reason that the vacancy cost function κ such that κ(0) = 0 is incompatible with variable measure of firms bounded by no-entry condition
J(0, y) = 0 is as follows (please refer to later pages for definitions). If y = 0, then J(0, y) = 0 holds with no firm entry. On the other hand, if
y > 0, firm entry must continue until J(0, y) = 0 is restored with y = 0 (adjustment through θ alone cannot bring J = 0 since, for any high
value of θ, the entrant firm can set arbitrarily small m). Thus, no production equilibrium can be supported without fixed costs.
The other strategy to build a model for production economy would be to throw away 1), namely to assume that there exists κ > 0 such that
κ(0) = κ. It implies that the no-entry condition holds with y > 0. Since ∂J(t)/∂li j (t) > 0, it makes new entrants give up, whereas existing firms
are willing to operate. Hereby, simply assuming κ′(0) > 0 will not suffice, because it will make all firms shut down by optimality condition
(5.6) so far as entrants do not want to enter. Since the implication of such an alternative model does not significantly differ from the present
model, the simpler model is adopted. However, the emergence of the distribution of firm size is abstracted by doing so, which would have
arisen in the alternative model by historical movement of y.
2By equation (2.1), mi is directly related to the increase of labor force. It is labeled as “level of recruiting activities” instead of “number of job
vacancies” to abstract the strategic behavior to announce more job posts than actually wanted.
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would be a natural equilibrium when most of characteristics of firms relevant to matching are declarable whereas
those of workers are non-declarable. It results in the same outcome as random matching, so that the probability
that a firm receives applications per job posting is a decreasing function of the VU ratio in the labor market of
declarable type i, θi. It is denoted by ψ(θi) : R+ → R+.3 On the other hand, non-declarable type is matching
specific and non-declarable type j emerges with probability gi j ∈ (0, 1) among declarable type i where ∑ j gi j = 1.
Therefore, if a firm exerts recruiting effort mi on declarable type i in the labor market, it will receive gi j ψ(θi) mi
applications from type (i, j) worker.
On the other hand, there are two factors which affect outflow from the employment stock. One is an uncontrol-
lable leave of workers.4 This natural separation of type (i, j) worker at time t is a Poisson arrival with parameter
σi j(t) > 0.5 The other factor is intentional dismiss by the firm. Dismissal of type (i, j) worker is denoted by
xi j ∈ [0, X] where X ∈ (0,∞) is a sufficiently large number and can be interpreted as a physical boundary of
adjustment speed of employment downward. Note that the firm can specify the worker type to dismiss since the
non-declarable property of a worker is revealed during the employment period.
Now, the firm can control the time derivative of type (i, j) employment using mi and xi j so that
(2.1) ˙li j = gi j ψ(θi) mi − σi jli j − xi j ∀i = 1, . . . , L, ∀ j = 1, . . . , Mi.
Notation φi j(t) := gi j(t)ψ(θi(t)) is sometimes used for simplicity.
Job posting is assumed to be costly. Smith (1999) assumed a linear vacancy cost function, so that a firm
employs all necessary workers to reach to the steady state in the first period, and then it maintains the steady
state forever. With this carefully arranged setup, adjustment process to the steady state is virtually abstracted but
at the same time it omits robustness against small perturbations on functional form. To restore robustness, we
are induced to assume a convex vacancy cost function following a minimalist principle, which has the property
that the derivative is monotone and also the implied equilibrium outcome does not diverge. It would be a natural
assumption from the viewpoint that a vacancy cost function should be regarded as an adjustment cost function. In
practical applications, the cost should be interpreted to include the cost for orientation, training and deterioration
of productivity that arises from on-the-job training and inexperience of new workers, as well as the cost necessary
for actual recruiting. Modifying the functional form in this way definitely complicates the analysis compared
to a linear case, but it should be emphasized that such a model brings significantly different macroeconomic
implications. We denote the vacancy cost function of declarable type i by κi(mi, t) : R+ × R+ → R+ where κi ≥ 0,
∂κi/∂mi ≥ 0, ∂2κ/∂m2i > 0, κi(0, t) = ∂κi/∂mi(0) = 0, and the second argument will be sometimes omitted for
simple notation, i.e. κi(·) := κi(·, t). The time-dependency of κi allows it to depend on θi. Another cost for a firm is
3This is a special case of Yokota (2004) so that the quality threshold of a firm to decline an applicant is set to zero to conform the current
problem setting. In this paper, rejection is detached to the choice of xi j .
4Since it turns out later that the value of employment status is always greater than the value of unemployment status, this shock is not only
external for firms but also for workers.
5It may be more natural to assume that the quality of a match gradually turns out on the job as in Jovanovic (1979). However, we abstract
internal working of separation.
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wage payment to each type of workers. Wage payment is determined by bargaining between a firm and workers to
share their rent that arises from historical advantages that an already-formed coalition possesses. Wage rate will
be shown to be a function of employment. Therefore, the firm decides the amount of employment knowing the
wage schedule it faces. We denote the wage function of type (i, j) by wi j(l).
On the demand side, consumers demand outputs based on information about current assets, current income
and the state of expectation on series of future income which is influenced by the degree of coordination among
agents. The expectation on intertemporal income holds both on and off equilibrium paths. In the present model,
temporary equilibrium is brought by adjustment in the interest rate. Temporary supply is fixed at any given
instance, therefore interest rate adjusts temporary demand to meet it affecting intertemporal relative prices. The
model also allows for analysis when disturbances are added to the adjustment in interest rates in the goods market.
In such a case, temporary disequilibrium arises in addition to long-run disequilibrium. Another such instance is
the case of perishable goods since it physically prohibits intertemporal consumption smoothing by consumers. Let
us denote by y(t) the “demand density” defined by
(2.2) y(t) = f (l(t), n) +
(
D(r, y˜, t) −
∫ 1
0
f (l(t), n) dn
)
and
(2.3) y˙(t) = ˙D(r, y˜, t)
where we explicitly denote the production function of firm with index n by f (l, n) assuming integrability in n,
and D(r, y˜, t) is the total demand for outputs as of time t which is affected by interest rate r(τ) (t ≤ τ < ∞) and
income stream y˜(τ) (t ≤ τ < ∞). It also includes “queue” of demand which has not met by previous supply.
Equation (2.3) and the second term of equation (2.2) impose homogeneity among firms in terms of their future
prospectives, since they imply that additional demands are equally distributed among them. Modification of these
terms will introduce heterogeneity in their, say, marketing power and others. Thus, y should be understood as
rational expectation among market participants on prospectives of each firm. Since any firms cannot directly
affect r, y is given for any particular firm under rational expectation.6 Normalizing the price of output to one, the
instantaneous profit of the firm π is given by
π = min {y, f (l)} − w (l) · l −
L∑
i=1
κi (mi) .
6As Arrow (1959) argued that the economy will show evidences of monopoly and monopsony in any state of disequilibrium, pricing strategy
must be examined carefully here. Firms can potentially use their profits to lower nominal prices and expand their market share permanently.
However, such a move will be retaliated by other firms, resulting in failure of the original intention of market share extension. If demand is
elastic in interest rate, it increases temporary market production and lowers interest rate, but reduces future demand. Such a strategy costs
more than proportionate hiring costs but shifts demand from future to today. We assume away such a strategic move in price settings and the
firm simply takes the bargaining outcome of real wages. When demand has zero elasticity, there is no incentive to manipulate prices.
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When min{y, f (l)} = y, as far as there is no reason for labor hoarding, increasing l to make f (l) > y is obviously
suboptimal. Since the above formulation introduces indifferentiability in π that makes succeeding analysis diffi-
cult. In stead of handling the above formulation directly, we are going to analyze an “approximate” problem that
the firm maximizes profit π = f (l) − w (l) · l −∑Li=1 κi (mi) under the constraint f (l) ≤ y. It ignores cases in which
a firm hoards labor facing temporary demand recession, however their long-run outcome should be quite similar.
If it is expected that labor hoarding never occurs in future, both outcomes exactly coincide.7 Again, for simple
notation, the following notation is sometimes used: ci j(l) := wi j(l) li j for any (i, j).
2.2. Workers and consumers. Workers are in either state, employed or unemployed. An unemployed worker
of type (i, ·) at time t receives instantaneous unemployment benefit bi(t). An employed worker of type (i, j) will
be paid instantaneous wage wi j(t). The value of type-(i, ·) unemployment at time t is denoted by Ui(t) and the
value of type-(i, j) employment at time t is denote by Ei j(t). Matching sessions between job-seekers and vacancies
open at any moment. Matching probability of an unemployed worker is given by µi(t). It is in general influenced
by θi(t) but we suppress its explicit notation. Matching sessions are time-consuming and the length is random.
Agents cannot attend other matching sessions simultaneously while he is engaged in a particular session.8 When
an unemployed worker of declarable type i is successfully matched to find out his undeclarable type is j, he shifts
to the employment status of type (i, j). Namely, on success, he receives capital gain Ei j(t) − Ui(t). Assuming
workers are risk neutral, the Bellman equation for unemployment status is
(2.4) r(t) Ui(t) = bi (t) + µi(t) E j
[
Ei j(t) − Ui(t)
]
+ ˙Ui(t), ∀i
where r is interest rate and Ej
[
Ei j(t) − Ui(t)
]
:=
∑Mi
j=1 gi j(t) Ei j(t) −Ui(t). Similarly, the employment value of type
(i, j) is given by
(2.5) r(t) Ei j(t) = wi j(t) − σ˜i j(t)
[
Ei j(t) − Ui(t)
]
+ ˙Ei j(t), ∀i, j
where σ˜i j(t) := σi j(t) + xi j(t)/li j(t) is separation probability for a worker.
3. Bargaining over Coalitional Rent
When there exists friction in the labor market, pseudo-rent arises in an existing firm-workers group. The rent
comes from the fact that any firms or workers who have not formed a group yet must enter a costly process of
search. It makes a room for bargaining over the rent between a firm and workers who have already formed a
group. Therefore, production should be regarded as coalitionally undertaken by the going concern and present
employees, and distribution of payoffs is made through bargaining taking into account future renewal of players.
7If unintended inventory investment is included in the definition of y as in that of national accounts, this problem will not arise.
8If matching sessions open continuously and end instantaneously, all agents on one side of the labor market will be matched immediately
almost surely.
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Coalition of a firm and each type of workers with measure li j will get intertemporal payoff ¯F which is the value of
F
(
l(t)
)
=
∫ ∞
t
 f (l∗(ξ)) −
L∑
i=1
κi
(
m∗i (ξ)
) e− ∫ ξt r(τ) dτdξ
where l∗ and m∗i are on the optimal path for the firm in the concomitant problem defined in section 5. In this
coalition, bargaining is made among continuously many players. It will be found that the imputation to give
workers just the half of their marginal gain, i.e.
Ei j =
1
2
Ui +
1
2
∂F
∂li j
is strongly supported as a bargaining solution.9 For the moment, to clarify conditions characterizing the solution,
argument proceeds with a general setup that wage bargaining should satisfy.
LetΩ be a set of all players. Players are partitioned by groups S i (i = 0, 1, . . . , M; M ∈ N) such that ∪Ni=1S i = Ω
and ∩Ni=1S i = ∅. Each group consists of Ni ∈ N ∪ {∞} players. The j-th player in group S i is denoted by si( j)
( j = 1, . . . , Ni). si( j) has measure dli for all j and there exists a fixed number li ∈ R+ such that Ni dli = li for all i.
Characteristic function is denoted by v : 2Ω → R. We require following assumptions:
(1) (Essential game) The game is essential, i.e. v(Ω) > ∑s∈Ω v({s}).
(2) (Anonymity) Players in the same group are anonymous, i.e. for any S and j, v
(
S ∪
{
si( j)}) − v(S ) is
common.
(3) (Indispensability) Missing groups make coalition unproductive, i.e. v(S ) = ∑i, j∈S v({si( j)}) if there exists
i such that S ∩ S i = ∅.
(4) (Existence of a non-degenerate player) S 0 is a special group which consists of only one player, i.e. N0 ≡ 1.
Refer to this game with symbol a1N(Ω, v) where N := (N0, . . . , NM). Next, define a more specific game in the
class of a1N(Ω, v) which possesses essential concavity as an additional assumption. It requires concavity only
for coalitions with more than two players so that essentiality of the game will not be lost.10 Namely, we put the
following additional property:
(5) (Essential concavity) The game is essentially concave, i.e. its characteristic function v has the property
that, if S , T ⊆ Ω satisfies ∅ ⊂ S ⊂ T , then
v(S ∪ {s}) − v(S ) ≥ v(T ∪ {s}) − v(T )
for any s ∈ Ω \ T .
Refer to this game with symbol a2N(Ω, v). Finally, define an even more specific game a3N(Ω, v) which is directly
related to our problem. Players are grouped by categories which are classified in two dimensions so that any player
9We require a singleton solution to proceed with the model. Pissarides (1985) assumed that, in the case that production is undertaken by a
pair of a firm and a worker, they divide the rent by a Nash bargaining solution. There is an option to generalize it adopting n-player Nash
equilibrium. However, since the present model contains significant asymmetry between a firm and workers, it seems more natural to take
coalitional rationality into account.
10A globally concave game always violates zero-additivity, thus formation of non-trivial coalitions cannot be expected.
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belongs to ˜S i j for i = 0, . . . , L and j = 1, . . . , Mi where ⋃Li=0 ⋃Mij=1 ˜S i j = Ω and ˜S i j∩ ˜S i′ j′ = ∅ for any (i, j) , (i′, j′).
Characteristic function is defined by
(3.1) v(S ) =

∑
i∈S Ui if there exists i such that S ∩ ˜S i j = ∅
F(˜l11, . . . , ˜lLML ) otherwise
where Ui ≥ 0 for all i, ˜li j :=
∥∥∥S ∩ ˜S i j∥∥∥ and F is increasing and concave. Obviously, this is a special case of
a
2
N(Ω, v) with ˜S i j = S∑i−1k=0 Mk+ j−1. However, we will not utilize the above additional specifications to characterize
solution concepts. They are only used to relate the results obtained in this section to the rest of the paper.
Our objective is to obtain a bargaining solution of the above games when N → ∞′ where ∞′ := (∞, . . . ,∞) ∈
(R ∪ {∞})M keeping li fixed for all i > 0. Note that, by doing so, the firm s0(1) keeps discrete influence on
coalitional payoff. The property that workers get only partial contribution depends on the assumption that players
in S 0 does not degenerate, rather than the particular value assumption N0 ≡ 1. Also, note that concavity of v and
F is sufficient to hold only from below at Ω and l, respectively, i.e. the concavity need not hold for supersets of Ω
or any ˆl ≥ l with ˆli j > li j for some i, j. This fact will be used in section 6. Denote the density imputation to player
s by ι(s), i.e. imputation of player s with measure dl becomes ι(s) dl.
Lemma 1. In a1∞′ (Ω, v), the imputation to allocate
(3.2) ι(si( j)) dli = 12 v
({
si( j)}) + 12
[
v(Ω) − v
(
Ω \
{
si( j)})]
to any workers of type (i, j) is supported by Shapley value.
Proof. Choose a player sıˆ( ˆ) for some ıˆ and ˆ. Consider any coalition S such that sıˆ( ˆ) ∈ S containing ni players
from group S i such that ni ≥ 0 and nıˆ ≥ 1. The contribution of sıˆ( ˆ) to coalition S is v({sıˆ( ˆ)}) if there exists i
such that S ∩ S i = ∅ from the indispensability assumption. In other cases, it is v(S )− v(S \ {sıˆ( ˆ)}). The Shapley’s
weight γ(S ) for the contribution of sıˆ( ˆ) to coalition S is given by
γ(S ) = (
∑M
i=0 ni − 1)!(
∑M
i=0 Ni −
∑M
i=0 ni)!
(∑Mi=0 Ni)!
=

M∑
i=0
Ni

−1 (∑M
i=0 Ni − 1∑M
i=0 ni − 1
)−1
.
Without loss of generality, let us assume ıˆ = 1 below for concise notations. From the anonymity assumption, any
S with same (n0, . . . , nM) has the same γ(S ). The number of cases to form coalition S containing sıˆ( ˆ) = s1( ˆ)
with same (n0, . . . , nM) is given by (
N0
n0
)
·
(
N1 − 1
n1 − 1
)
·
(
N2
n2
)
· · ·
(
NM
nM
)
.
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Then, Shapley value is given by
(3.3) ι(s1( ˆ)) dl1 =

∑
{S :
∏M
i=0 ni=0}
Γ(S )
 v
(
{s1( ˆ)}
)
+
∑
{S :
∏M
i=0 ni≥1}
Γ(S )
[
v(S ) − v
(
S \
{
s1( ˆ)})]
where
Γ(S ) := γ(S ) ·
(
N0
n0
)
·
(
N1 − 1
n1 − 1
)
·
(
N2
n2
)
· · ·
(
NM
nM
)
=
(
N0
n0
)
·
(
N1−1
n1−1
)
·
(
N2
n2
)
· · ·
(
NM
nM
)
(∑M
i=0 Ni
) (∑M
i=0 Ni−1∑M
i=0 ni−1
) .
Proposition 23 in Appendix A show that coefficient Γ(S ) is a probability mass function such that Γ(S ) = Υ(n0, n1−
1, n2, . . . , nM; N0, N1 − 1, N2, . . . , NM) where distribution Υ is defined in Appendix A. Note that the distribution
possesses point symmetry Υ(n1, . . . , nM; ζ1, . . . , ζM) = Υ(ζ1 − n1, . . . , ζM − nM; ζ1, . . . , ζM). Using these two facts,
∑
{S :n0=0}
Γ(S ) =
∑
{S :n0=1}
Γ(S )
Now, in either case of n0 = 0, 1,
∑
{S :
∏M
i=1 ni=0} Γ(S ) → 0 as Ni → ∞ for all i = 1, . . . , M.
∑
{S :
∏M
i=1 ni=0} Γ(S ) can be
written as
∑
{S :
∏M
i=1 ni=0}
Γ(S ) =
∏
{i:ni=0,n1=1}
(
Ni
0
)
∑M
i=0 Ni
∑
ni
∏
{i:ni≥1,n1≥2}
(
Ni
ni
)
(∑M
i=0 Ni−1∑M
i=0 ni−1
)
=
1∑M
i=0 Ni
∑
ni
∏
{i:ni≥1,n1≥2}
(
Ni
ni
)
(∑M
i=0 Ni−1∑M
i=0 ni−1
)
where the right hand side converges to zero as Ni → ∞. Therefore,
∑
{S :
∏M
i=0 ni=0}
Γ(S ) ≈
∑
{S :n0=0}
Γ(S ) =
∑
{S :n0=1}
Γ(S ) ≈
∑
{S :
∏M
i=0 ni≥1}
Γ(S ) ≈ 1
2
.
It shows the coefficient of v
(
{sıˆ( ˆ)}
)
dlıˆ in (3.3) converges to 1/2 as N → ∞′. From Proposition 24 in Appendix A,
we obtain
ι
(
si( j)) dli = 12 v
({
si( j)}) + 12
[
v(Ω) − v
(
Ω \
{
si( j)})]
for all i, j. 
The above derivation critically depends on the indispensability and the existence assumption of a non-degenerate
player, which enable for the firm to keep discrete influence on payoffs whereas that of individual workers becomes
negligible as N → ∞′. On the other hand, characterizing bargaining solution as nucleolus requires an additional
assumption that the game should be essentially concave. At the outset, the following lemma shows that core is
non-empty if and only if the production process is more productive for the last marginal worker than unemploy-
ment in terms of value.
Lemma 2. a1N(v,Ω) has non-empty core if it is zero-additive. So does a2N(v,Ω) if and only if
(3.4) v
(
Ω
)
− v
(
Ω \ {si( j)}
)
≥ v
(
{si( j)}
)
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for all i, j. In a3N(v,Ω), the condition (3.4) is replaced by ∂F/∂li j ≥ Ui.
Proof. We start from the necessary condition of a1. Consider imputation such that any s ∈ Ω \ S 0 is allocated by
ι(s) = v({s}) and player s0(1) is allocated by ι(s0(1)) = v(Ω) −∑s∈Ω\S 0 v(s). This is feasible by essentiality of the
game. Obviously, any S such that s0(1) < S satisfies coalitional rationality since ∑s∈S ι(s) ≥ v(S ) = ∑s∈S v({s}).
So does any coalition S such that s0(1) ∈ S since its imputation yields ∑s∈S ι(s) = v(Ω) − ∑s<S v(s) ≥ v(S ) by
zero-additivity. which implies that this imputation is located in core. If (3.4) holds for a2, zero-additivity holds
from the essential concavity, which shows that (3.4) is a necessary condition fora2. The case fora3 is direct from
this since a3 is a special case of a2.
To show (3.4) is a sufficient condition for a2, suppose v(Ω) − v
(
Ω \ {si( j)}
)
< v
(
{si( j)}
)
for some i, j. The
individual rationality of si( j) requires ι
(
si( j)
)
≥ v
(
{si( j)}
)
. Also, coalition of the rest requires
∑
s∈Ω\{si( j)} ι
(
s
)
≥
v
(
Ω \ {si( j)}
)
, which implies ι
(
si( j)
)
≤ v(Ω) − v
(
Ω \ {si( j)}
)
< v
(
{si( j)}
)
. These two equations are not satisfied
at the same time, thus core is empty. It shows zero-additivity is also sufficient. The result for a3 is derived from
this. 
Following the context of our model in which workers and the firm are all rational in participating in production,
the bargaining solution must be in core. Otherwise, at least one player will leave the coalition, which implies
that the current coalition is not actually on the optimal path. The above lemma means that the problem can be
restricted to the case of ∂F/∂li j ≥ Ui on the optimal path.
Lemma 3. If game (Ω, v) is essentially concave in which players are partitioned by groups such that Ω = ⋃Mi=1 S i
and ⋂Mi=1 S i = ∅, then for any S , T ⊆ Ω such that S ⊂ T, the following inequality holds.
v(T ) − v(T \ S ) ≥
n∑
i=1
‖S ∩ S i‖
[
v(T ) − v
(
T \ {si( j)}
)]
Proof. See Appendix B. 
This lemma is analogous to the property of an ordinary concave function: f (x1 +∆x1, . . . , xn+∆xn) ≤ fx1∆x1 +
· · · + fxn∆xn in which each axis corresponds to ‖S ∩ S i‖. It is required to derive nucleolus of the game.
Lemma 4. In a2N (Ω, v) for any N, the imputation (3.2) is supported by nucleolus.11
Proof. The proof starts from the following lemma.
Lemma 5. Consider a coalitional gamea2N(Ω, v) for given N in which v(Ω)− v
(
Ω \
{
si( j)}) ≥ v({si( j)}) holds for
any i, j. Then, in any max-reduced game of a2N(Ω, v), the least core Γ(εn) is characterized by excess
(3.5) εn = −12
[
v (Ωn) − v
(
Ωn \
{
sıˆ( j)}) − v({sıˆ( j)})]
where Ωn is a set of players in the n-th reduced game and ıˆ = arg mini v (Ωn) − v
(
Ωn \
{
sıˆ( j)})− v({sıˆ( j)}) in which
j can be arbitrary by anonymity.
11This result coincides with Stole and Zwiebel (1996) by extending its result to a case of infinite number of agents.
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Proof of Lemma 5. In the n-th reduced game, characteristic function is given by
(3.6) v(S ) =

v (Ω \Ωn ∪ S ) −∑s∈Ω\Ωn ι(s) if s0(1) ∈ S
∑
s∈S v
(
{s}
)
if s0(1) < S
for any S ⊆ Ω.
Consider imputation in the ε-core for given excess εn. Individual rationality with excess ε requires ι
(
si( j)) to
be
(3.7) ι(si( j)) ≥ v(si( j)) − εn
for all i, j. On the other hand, coalitional rationality with excess εn of the complement of the above, i.e. Ωn\{si( j)},
requires
∑
s∈Ωn\
{
si( j)
} ι(s) ≥ v(Ωn \ {si( j)}) − εn. Since total rationality implies ι(si( j)) = v(Ωn) −∑s∈Ωn\{si( j)} ι(s), it
leads to
(3.8) ι(si( j)) ≤ v(Ωn) − v(Ωn \ {si( j)}) + εn
In the payoff space {X ∈ R
∑
i Ni }where X :=
(
ι
(
s1(1)), . . . , ι(sM(NM))), consider a domain which satisfies coalitional
rationality of player set S and its complement Ωn \ S on simplex manifold ∆ :=
{
X ∈ R
∑
i Ni :
∑
s∈Ωn ι(s) = v(Ωn)
}
to satisfy total rationality and denote it by B(S , εn). Without loss of generality, s0(1) < S can be assumed by
symmetry. Then, ε-core is obtained by finding out minε{ε :
⋂
S∈2Ωn B(S , εn) , ∅}. Generally, B(S , εn) has the form
(3.9) B(S , εn) =
X ∈ ∆ : v(S ) − εn ≤
∑
s∈S
ι(s) ≤ v(Ωn) − v (Ωn \ S ) + εn
 .
From (3.7) and (3.8), B
({
si( j)}, εn) becomes
(3.10) B
({
si( j)}, εn) = {X ∈ ∆ : v(si( j)) − ε ≤ ι(si( j)) ≤ v(Ωn) − v(Ωn \ {si( j)}) + ε}
and therefore
(3.11)
⋂
s∈Ωn
B
({
s
}
, εn
)
=
X ∈ ∆ :
∑
s∈Ωn
v
(
{s}
)
−

M∑
i=1
Ni
 ε ≤ ∑
s∈Ωn
ι(s) ≤
∑
s∈Ωn
[
v(Ωn) − v(Ωn \ {s})] +

M∑
i=1
Ni
 ε

Since ε forms least core, it is chosen to make B
({
si( j)}, εn) non-empty. We are going to show minεn {εn :⋂
S∈2Ωn B(S , εn) , ∅} = minεn {εn :
⋂
s∈Ωn B
(
{s}, εn
)
, ∅}.
From Lemma 2, εn ≤ 0. Therefore,
(3.12) v(S ) − εn ≤ v(S ) − mεn ≤
∑
s∈S
v
(
{s}
)
− mεn
for any m ∈ N. On the other hand, from Lemma 3,
v(Ωn) − v(Ωn \ S ) + εn ≥ v(Ωn) − v(Ωn \ S ) + mεn
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≥
∑
s∈S
[
v(Ωn) − v(Ωn \ {si( j)})] + mεn(3.13)
holds for any m ∈ N. From (3.12) and (3.13), (3.9) and (3.11) imply, for any S ∈ 2Ωn , B(S , ε) ⊇ ⋂s∈Ωn B({s}, εn),
from which minεn {εn :
⋂
S∈2Ωn B(S , εn) , ∅} = minεn {εn :
⋂
s∈Ωn
B
(
{s}, εn
)
, ∅} is derived.
From (3.10), the condition to degenerate ι(si( j)) to a point is given by v(si( j))− εn = v(Ωn)− v(Ωn \ {si( j)})+ εn
from which we obtain
ε∗n(i, j) = −
1
2
[
v (Ωn) − v
(
Ωn \
{
si( j)}) − v({si( j)})] .
If εn becomes smaller than ε∗n(i, j), ι
(
si( j)) that satisfies (3.10) becomes empty. Thus, for minεn {εn : ⋂s∈Ωn B({s}, εn) ,
∅} to be obtained, it must be set εn = maxi ε∗n(i, j), from which the lemma is derived. 
Continuation of proof of Lemma 4. From Lemma 5, any workers in group ıˆ obtain excess (3.5). Therefore, their
payoff ι
(
sıˆ( j)) becomes
ι
(
sıˆ( j)) = v({sıˆ( j)}) − εn = 12 v
({
sıˆ( j)}) + 12
[
v (Ωn) − v
(
Ωn \
{
sıˆ( j)})] .
The (n + 1)-th reduced game has player set Ωn+1 = Ωn \⋂Nıˆj=1{sıˆ( j)}, i.e. all players in group ıˆ are removed from
the game. Note that player s0(1) stays in the new game. According to the definition of max-reduced games, its
characteristic function becomes
v(Ωn+1) = v(Ωn) −
Nıˆ∑
j=1
ι
(
sıˆ( j)) = v(Ω) − ⋃
s∈Ωn+1
ι(s)
and, for any S ⊂ Ωn+1,
v(S ) = max
v(S ∪ Q) −
∑
s∈Q
ι(s) : Q ⊆ Ω \Ωn+1

=

v
(
S ∪ (Ω \Ωn+1) −∑s∈Ω\S ι(s) if s0(1) ∈ S
∑
s∈S v(s) if s0(1) < S
which confirms that the assumed characteristic function of Ωn is actually correct by induction.
If ∂F/∂li j ≥ Ui for all Υ, the game is zero-monotone, and the above lexicographic center is nucleolus (?). Since
core is non-empty from Lemma 2, the nucleolus is included in core. 
Theorem 6. In a3∞′ (Ω, v), the following imputation is supported by Shapley value and nucleolus.
Ei j(n) = 12
(
Ui +
∂F
∂li j
)
Proof. The result follows from Lemma 1 and Lemma 4. For the latter, it is sufficient to show that F satisfies
essential concavity. From concavity of F,
∑
i, j
(
∂F(l1)/∂li j
)
dli j ≤
∑
i, j
(
∂F(l2)/∂li j
)
dli j. Pick up any type (ıˆ, ˆ)
and set dli j = 0 for any (i, j) , (ıˆ, ˆ). Then,
(
∂F(l1)/∂lıˆ ˆ
)
dlıˆ ˆ ≤
(
∂F(l2)/∂lıˆ ˆ
)
dlıˆ ˆ which implies essential concavity
of F, i.e. F(l1 + δlıˆ ˆ) − F(l1) ≤ F(l2 + δlıˆ ˆ) − F(l2) where δlıˆ ˆ denotes the measure of type-(ıˆ, ˆ) labor. 
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We labeled S 0 as a set of a firm or an entrepreneur above. However, if there is any player who exerts non-
degenerate influence on productivity or, in other words, those who embodies critical knowledge for production as
rent, this player will receive non-marginal part of coalitional rent. In this section, we derived bargaining solution
in terms of value function. Its distribution is actually done through wage payment. Bargaining outcome in terms
of wages is derived in section 4 and Appendix C.
4. Wage Function
In this section, wage function is derived when there exists some σ˜i ≥ 0 for all i such that σ˜i j = σ˜i for all j.
This is the case, for example, if there are multiple declarable types, the natural separation rate is common for all
those types and potential demand constraint is unbinding. The condition is obviously satisfied with one kind of
labor. The wage function in general cases is more complicated than presented in this section and it is derived in
Appendix C.12
By defining zi j := Ei j−Ui for all (i, j) ∈ Υ in Bellman equations (2.4) and (2.5), the dimension of the dynamics
is reduced by one:
(4.1) z˙i(t) = Ai(t) zi(t) −ωi(t)
where zi(t) :=

zi1(t)
zi2(t)
...
ziMi (t)

, Ai(t) :=

r(t) + σ˜i(t) + gi1µi(t) gi2µi(t) · · · giMiµi(t)
gi1µi(t) r(t) + σ˜i(t) + gi2µi(t) giMiµi(t)
...
. . .
...
gi1µi(t) gi2µi(t) · · · r(t) + σ˜i(t) + giMiµi(t)

and ω(t) :=

w11(t) − b1(t)
w12(t) − b1(t)
...
wLML (t) − bL(t)

. Note that A(t) has eigenvalues r(t) + σ˜i(t) with multiplicity (M − 1) and r(t) +
σ˜i(t) + µ(t) with multiplicity one.13 It can be confirmed that the following provides the elementary matrix Φ(t, s):
Φi(t, s) := e
∫ t
s
Ai(q)dq = e
∫ t
s
(r(q)+σ˜i(q))dq
[
I +
(
e
∫ t
s
µi(q) dq − 1
)
G
]
where I is an identity matrix and Gi is an “expectation matrix”
Gi =

gi1 gi2 · · · giMi
...
...
...
gi1 gi2 · · · giMi

.
12The arguments below follows the traditional derivation of wages for comparison purpose. However, it would be more straightforward to use
“integral version” of Bellman equations as in Appendix C out of steady state.
13To obtain this simple result, common separation rate among all undeclarable types of workers is critical.
PRODUCTION THEORY WITH CONVEX LABOR FRICTION 14
Namely, zi(t) = Φi(t, s) c for any c ∈ R2 solves the accompanying homogeneous equation to (4.1). Then, the
solution to (4.1) is given by z(t) = Φ(t, 0)[z0 −
∫ t
0 Φ(s, 0)−1ω(s) ds] = e
∫ t
0 A(q)dq[z0 −
∫ t
0 e
−
∫ s
0 A(q)dq ω(s) ds] for any
initial value z(0) = z0 = (z10, . . . , zL0). Note that Φ(t, s)−1 = e−
∫ t
s
A(q)dq
. For the no-Ponzi game condition to hold,
the initial value must be set at z0 =
∫ ∞
0 Φ(s, 0)−1 ω(s) ds in which integration is bounded. For such an initial value,
z(t) =
∫ ∞
t
Φ(s, t)−1 ω(s) ds =
∫ ∞
t
e−
∫ s
t
A(q)dq
ω(s) ds. Using the fact that [I + (α − 1) G]−1 = I +
(
α−1 − 1
)
G for any
scholar α, it is found that
Φi (s, t)−1 = e−
∫ s
t
(r+σ˜i)
[
I +
(
e−
∫ s
t
µi − 1
)
Gi
]
.
Namely,
(4.2) zi j (t) =
∫ ∞
t
e−
∫ s
t (r+σ˜i)
[(
wi j − bi
)
− E j
(
wi j − bi
)]
ds +
∫ ∞
t
e−
∫ s
t (r+σ˜i+µi)E j
(
w j − bi
)
ds
where expectation E is taken over all possible undeclarable worker types. Solving differential equation (2.4) for
Ui using (4.2),
Ui(t) =
∫ ∞
t
e−
∫ s
t
r
[
bi(s) + µi(s)
∫ ∞
s
E j
(
wi j(ξ) − bi(ξ)
)
e−
∫ ξ
s
(r+σ˜i+µi)dξ
]
ds(4.3)
Similarly, we obtain the value function of employment for each type.
Ei j(t) =
∫ ∞
t
e−
∫ s
t rwi j(s)ds(4.4)
+
∫ ∞
t
ds
∫ ∞
s
e−
∫ s
t rσ˜i(s) · e−
∫ ξ
s
(r+σ˜i)
[
E j
(
wi j(ξ) − bi(ξ)
)
−
(
wi j − bi
)]
dξ
−
∫ ∞
t
ds
∫ ∞
s
e−
∫ s
t
rσ˜i(s) · e−
∫ ξ
s
(r+σ˜i+µi)E j
(
wi j(ξ) − bi(ξ)
)
dξ
The unemployment value is the discounted series of unemployment benefit and capital gain arising from matching.
The employment value is the discounted series of wage rate, expected change of capital gain in new jobs and capital
gain (loss) of dismissal.
Proposition 7. Wage rate at time t is given by
(4.5) wi j(t) = bi(t) +
(
EhFih(t) − bi(t)2
)
+
1
2
(
EhFih(t) − Fi j(t)
)
+
(
σ˜i(t) + µ(t)2
) ∫ ∞
t
(
EhFih(ξ) − bi(ξ)2
)
e−
∫ ξ
t
(r+µi/2)dξ + 1
2
σ˜i(t)
∫ ∞
t
(
EhFih(ξ) − Fi j(ξ)
)
e−
∫ ξ
t
rdξ
where Fi is capital gain of marginal value of production, i.e. Fi j := r∂F/∂li j − ∂2F/∂t∂li j.
Proof. Theorem 6 implies ∂2F/∂t ∂li = 2 ˙Ei − ˙U. Applying (2.4), (2.5), (4.3) and (4.4),
∂2F(t)
∂t∂li j
= r(t)∂F(t)
∂li j
−
(
2wi j(t) − bi(t)
)
+ 2σ˜i(t) zi j(t) − µi(t)
∫ ∞
t
Eh (wih − bi) e−
∫ ξ
t
(r+µ+σ˜i)dξ(4.6)
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Taking difference of (4.6) for any i and j , i, we obtain a Volterra integral equation of the second kind concerning
wih and wi j.14
(4.7)
(
wi j(t) − wih(t)
)
− σ˜i(t)
∫ ∞
t
(
wi j(ξ) − wih(ξ)
)
e−
∫ ξ
t
(r+σ˜i)dξ = 1
2
[
r(t)
(
∂F(t)
∂li j
−
∂F(t)
∂lih
)
−
(
∂2F(t)
∂t∂li j
−
∂2F(t)
∂t∂lih
)]
On the other hand, taking expectation of (4.6) yields
(4.8) Eh (wih(t) − bi(t)) −
(
σ˜i(t) − µi(t)2
) ∫ ∞
t
Eih (wih(ξ) − bi(ξ)) e−
∫ ξ
t
(r+σ˜i+µi)dξ
=
1
2
Eh
(
r(t)∂F(t)
∂lih
−
∂2F(t)
∂t∂lih
− bi(t)
)
The above results suggest that it is beneficial to define new variables Yi j(t) ( j = 1, 2, . . . , Mi) as follows.
(4.9)

Yi1(t)
Yi2(t)
Yi3(t)
...
YiMi (t)

:=

gi1 gi2 gi3 · · · giMi
1 −1 0 · · · 0
1 0 −1 · · · 0
...
...
...
. . .
...
1 0 0 · · · −1


wi1(t) − bi(t)
wi2(t) − bi(t)
wi3(t) − bi(t)
...
wiMi (t) − bi(t)

Observe that the above conversion matrix is the same as the eigenvector matrix of Ai(t). By this change of
variables, we can “diagonalize” the simultaneous integral equations concerning wi j’s, (4.7) and (4.8). Namely,

Yi1(t)
...
YiMi (t)

−
∫ ∞
t

Ki1(t, ξ) O
. . .
O KiMi (t, ξ)


Yi1(ξ)
...
YiMi (ξ)

dξ = 1
2

hi1
...
hiM

where
Ki1(t, ξ) :=
(
σ˜i(t) − µi(t)2
)
e−
∫ ξ
t
(r+σi+µi)
Ki j(t, ξ) := σ˜i(t) e−
∫ ξ
t (r+σ˜i) (for all j = 2, . . . , Mi)
hi1(t) := Eh
(
r(t)∂F(t)
∂lih
−
∂2F(t)
∂t∂lih
− bi(t)
)
hi j(t) := r(t)
(
∂F(t)
∂li j
−
∂F(t)
∂l1 j
)
−
(
∂2F(t)
∂t∂li j
−
∂2F(t)
∂t∂l1 j
)
(for all j = 2, . . . , M)
and the integration is applied element-wise. Then, the solution to this equation is given by

Yi1(t)
...
YiMi (t)

=
1
2

hi1(t)
...
hiMi (t)

−
1
2
∫ ∞
t

Gi1(t, ξ) O
. . .
O GiMi (t, ξ)


hi1(ξ)
...
hiMi (ξ)

dξ
14Note that it is impossible to obtain a differential equation by taking time derivative of this equation since t resides inside of the integration.
It is a general consequence of non-stationarity.
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where Gi j(t, ξ) := −∑∞ζ=1
∗
Kζi j(t, ξ) for j = 1, 2, . . . , Mi. Iterated kernel
∗
Kn is defined by
∗
Kn := K ∗ K ∗ · · · ∗ K︸             ︷︷             ︸
n
and
K ∗ L denotes the composition of the first kind defined by K(t, ξ) ∗ L(t, ξ) =
∫ ξ
t
K(t, τ) L(τ, ξ) dτ (see e.g. Yokota
(2006) and other literature on integral equations). Since
∗
Kni1(t, ξ) =
(
σ˜i(t) + µi2 (t)
)
e−
∫ ξ
t
(r+σi+µi)
[∫ ξ
t
(
σ˜i(s) + µi(s)2
)
ds
]n−1
(n − 1)!
∗
Kni j(t, ξ) = σ˜i(t)e−
∫ ξ
t
(r+σi)
[∫ ξ
t
σ˜i(s) ds
]n−1
(n − 1)! (for all j = 2, . . . , M),
we obtain
Gi11(t, ξ) = −
(
σ˜i(t) + µi(t)2
)
e−
∫ ξ
t
(r+µi/2)
Gij j(t, ξ) = −σ˜i(t) e−
∫ ξ
t
r (for all j = 2, . . . , M)
and the solution for Yi j(t):
Yi1(t) = 12 hi1(t) +
1
2
(
σ˜i(t) + µi(t)2
) ∫ ∞
t
e−
∫ ξ
t
(r+µi/2)hi1(ξ) dξ
Yi j(t) = 12 hi j(t) +
1
2
σ˜i(t)
∫ ∞
t
e−
∫ ξ
t
rhi j(ξ) dξ (for all j = 2, . . . , M).
Inverting back to wi j(t) using the inverse function of (4.9), i.e.

wi1(t) − bi(t)
wi2(t) − bi(t)
...
wiM(t) − bi(t)

=


1 gi2 · · · giMi
1 gi2 · · · giMi
...
...
...
1 gi2 · · · giMi

−

0 0 · · · 0
0 1 O
...
. . .
0 O 1



Yi1(t)
Yi2(t)
...
YiMi (t)

,
the result of the proposition is derived. 
Note that, whereas wage rate responds immediately to the change of separation rate, its response to the change
of matching rate or marginal production value accompanies time-lag. It is caused by the fact that, while the
adjustment of workforce through dismissal is achieved promptly, the matching process is time-consuming. To see
the latter fact, suppose that there is only one kind of labor. Matching rate µ fluctuates according to µ(t) = 1 + sin t
and other unrelated variables are fixed. Then, from equation (4.5), wage rate is given by
w(t) = C0 +C1
(
C2 +
µ(t)
2
) ∫ ∞
t
exp
[
−
∫ ξ
t
(
C3 +
µ(s)
2
)
ds
]
dξ
= C0 +C1 (C2 + sin t) e−(cos t−C3t)/2
∫ ∞
t
e(cos ξ−C3ξ)/2dξ
where Ci (i = 1, 2, 3) are indeterminate constants. The functional form is drawn in the first graph of Figure 4.1.
The second graph shows the response of wages against the change in marginal productivity. Note that marginal
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(1) Response of wages w to matching rate µ
-7.5 -5 -2.5 0 2.5 5 7.5
time
wHtL
ΜHtL
(2) Response of wages w to marginal value of production ∂ f /∂l
-7.5 -5 -2.5 0 2.5 5 7.5
time
wHtL
¶f¶lHtL
Both show reaction of w to the forced oscillation in matching rate and in marginal productivity, respectively, where
µ(t) = ∂ f /∂l = 1 + sin t is assumed. Vertical constants are arbitrarily adjusted so that the phase shift is easily visible.
Used parameters are: b = 1, σ˜ = 1, r = 0.05, F = 1 for the first graph and b = 1, µ = 1, r = 0.05, te = 20 for the
second where te is the entering time to the bounded surface.
Figure 4.1: Response of wage rate to forced oscillation
productivity is a decreasing function of y. It will be shown that, when a firm is operating below the demand
surface, the marginal production value is given by ∂F/∂l =
∫ te
t
∂ f /∂l e−
∫ ξ
t
(r+σ˜)dξ where te is the entering time to
the demand surface. It assumes ∂ f /∂l = 1 + sin t,15 which implies F = p sin t − q cos for some p and q, therefore
the wage function becomes
w(t) = C0 + F +C1
∫ ∞
t
(C2 + F) e−C3(ξ−t)dξ
= C0 +
r sin t − cos t
2
+C1eC3 t
∫ ∞
t
(
C2 +
r sin ξ − cos ξ
2
)
e−C3ξdξ
These effects of matching rate and marginal productivity would show more or less synchronized behavior in the
actual economy, since they are countercyclical from each other. The lagged response shown above is not limited
to a special case where intertemporal fluctuation of µ or ∂ f /∂l is represented by a sine curve. As far as they are
absolutely integrable in terms of time, similar properties would be shown via Fourier transformation.
The above effect distorts the share between entrepreneurs and workers over business cycles. It can have real
effects when the aggregate demand is a function of the relative distribution between these two groups. Such
examples include the case where entrepreneurs have different saving ratio from workers, and the case where the
investment decision of firms is a positive function of profits.
Corollary 8. At steady state with one kind of labor, the wage rate w satisfies the following relation
(4.10) ∂F
∂l =
(
1 − σ˜
r + µ + σ˜
)
w
r
+
σ˜
r + µ + σ˜
b
r
+
r
r + µ + σ˜
(
w
r
−
b
r
)
.
15The case of binding demand constraint can be derived in a similar way where the only difference is that a cyclical component is introduced
in the discount factor. On the other hand, if the economy is about to leave the demand constraint, ∂F/∂l is not a simple integration of marginal
productivity.
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Furthermore, if w > b, then
∂F
∂l >
w
r + σ˜
holds.
Proof. Equation (4.10) is obtained by setting L = 1, M1 = 1 and all related variables to be at steady state. For the
latter half, we see that ∂F/∂l > w/(r + σ˜) is equivalent to (r2 + σ˜r + µσ˜)w > (r2 − σ˜2)b using equation (4.10). If
w > b, then (r2 + σ˜r + µσ˜)w > r2w > r2b > (r2 − σ˜2)b, which shows that this proposition is true. 
The steady state mentioned in the corollary can be either unbounded or bounded steady states. It shows that, as
far as work is more preferable than staying unemployed for workers, the firm is willing to employ more workers
once there arises additional demand for output. Furthermore, it should be observed that if output increases, the
marginal productivity of labor, i.e. the left-hand side in equation (4.10), decreases. Thus, increase of output
is achieved through the decrease of real wage rate in the wage bargaining, ceteris paribus. This result largely
depends on our setup assumptions that labor intensity is constant, that workers are not allowed to do overtime
work and that profits are not redistributed to workers, say, to provide incentives for efforts.
Now, we can present some general properties on wages. First, the expected present value of wages is gener-
ally greater than that of unemployment benefits as far as there remains production opportunities. Second, if the
marginal contribution to the value of production is decreasing over time, wage rate is greater than unemployment
benefit.
Proposition 9. If ∂F/∂li j > Ui for all (i, j), then
∫ ∞
t
E jwi j(s)e−
∫
(r+σ˜i+µi)ds >
∫ ∞
t
bi(s) e−
∫
(r+σ˜i+µi)ds.
Proof. From Lemma 1, the condition ∂F/∂li j > Ui implies zi j = (∂F/∂li j − Ui)/2 > 0. Namely,
zi j =
∫ ∞
t
Eh [wih − bi] e−
∫
(r+σ˜i+µi)ds −
∫ ∞
t
{
Eh [wih − bi] −
(
wi j − bi
)}
e−
∫
(r+σ˜i+µi)ds > 0
must hold for all (i, j) from (4.2), which yields
∫ ∞
t
Eh [wih − bi] e−
∫
(r+σ˜i+µi)ds > max
j
∫ ∞
t
{
Eh [wih − bi] −
(
wi j − bi
)}
e−
∫
(r+σ˜i+µi)ds ≥ 0
to obtain the result. 
Proposition 10. If ∂2F/∂t∂li j − ˙Ui ≤ 0, then wi j(t) > bi(t) for all (i, j) ∈ Υ and t.
Proof. From Theorem 6,
(4.11) ˙Ei j(t) = 12
(
˙Ui(t) + ∂
2F
∂t∂li j
(t)
)
which yields
˙Ei j(t) − ˙Ui(t) = 12
(
∂2F
∂t∂li j
(t) − ˙Ui(t)
)
≤ 0
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From (2.4) and (2.5)
wi j − bi = (r + σ˜i)
(
Ei j − Ui
)
+ µEh [Eih − Ui] −
(
˙Ei j − ˙Ui
)
> 0.

The condition of Proposition 10 obviously holds at a steady state either when the demand constraint is binding
or unbinding. On the other hand, when b is expected to rise only for a sufficiently short period of time from now
on, it can happen that wage rate becomes temporarily smaller than unemployment benefit whereas Ei > U still
holds and thus workers do not willing to quit the current jobs.
5. Production Plan
The results of the previous section show that the wage rate is a function of employment. Based on rational
expectation on wage schedule w(l), the firm determines optimal policy on vacancy post and dismissal. The optimal
problem for the firm is given by
J (l, y) = max
m,x
∫ ∞
t
 f (l) − w(l) · l −
L∑
i=1
κi(mi)
 exp
[
−
∫ ξ
t
r(τ)dτ
]
dξ(P)
subject to
˙li j = gi jψ(θi) mi − σi jli j − xi j, ∀i = 1, . . . , L; j = 1, . . . , Mi(2.1)
0 ≤ xi j ≤ X ∀i, j(5.1)
mi ≥ 0 ∀i(5.2)
f (l) ≤ y(5.3)
li j ≥ 0 ∀i, j(5.4)
li j(0),∀i, j given.
where parameters y, g, θ, σ are generally time-dependent and X is an arbitrarily large number. X is assumed to
be large enough so that a firm can accommodate any negative change of y. r is bounded and r(t) 9 0 as t → ∞.
Also, y(t) ∈ C2 as of the time of planning. It can show ex post indifferentiability as a result of unexpected shift
of y. It will be proven that labor market constantly shows the state of long-run excess demand below unbounded
steady states. Namely, if the firm can employ additional workers due to the increase of y, then it can increase
profits. Walras Law implies that the goods market is always in the state of excess supply regardless the relative
price between output goods and labor. On the other hand, the presence of a convex vacancy cost function prohibits
discrete increase of employment, which implies that aggregate production and income can grow only continuously
from the current level, and thus the excess supply in the goods market will not be resolved.
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Denote the costate variables corresponding to each transition equation of li j by λi j. An augmented Hamiltonian
H is defined by
H (ξ) := f (l) − w (l) · l −
L∑
i=1
κi(mi) +
∑
i, j
λi j
(
φi jmi − σi jli j − xi j
)
(5.5)
+ µ0
y˙ −
∑
i=i j
∂ f
∂li j
˙li j
 +
∑
i, j
µ1i j xi j +
∑
i, j
µ2i j
(
X − xi j
)
+
∑
i
γimi
where R(t, ξ) :=
∫ ξ
t
r(τ) dτ and µ0, µni j ≥ 0 for ∀i, j, n and γi ≥ 0 for ∀i are Lagrange multipliers such that any
terms including them are zero. From maximization of Hamiltonian function, optimal conditions for mi are given
by
κ′i (mi) =
∑
j
φi j
(
λi j − µ0 fi j
)
+ γi(5.6)
γimi = 0(5.7)
λi j − µ0 fi j = µ1i j − µ2i j(5.8)
where fi j := ∂ f /∂li j, and costate dynamics is given by
˙λi j =
(
r + σi j
)
λi j + µ0
(
˙fi j − σi j fi j
)
−
(
fi j − ci j
)
∀i, j(5.9)
where ˙fi j := ∑a,b(∂2 f /∂li j∂lab) ˙lab, µ0 > 0 when the demand constraint is binding and µ0 = 0 when not.
5.1. Optimal control.
(a) Off demand constraints. If the demand condition (5.3) is not binding, we have µ0 = 0. Then, the optimal
condition for x is given by
(5.10) xi j =

0 if λi j > 0
X if λi j < 0
∀i, j
Proposition 11. When f (l) < y, if ∑ j φi jλi j > 0, then mi > 0. If ∑ j φi jλi j ≤ 0, then mi = 0.
Proof. If ∑ j φiλi > 0, the right-hand side of equation (5.6) is strictly positive, which implies mi > 0. If ∑ j φi jλi j <
0, then γi > 0 since the left-hand side of equation (5.6) must be non-negative. From equation (5.7), it implies
mi = 0. If
∑
j φi jλi j = 0, then equation (5.6) becomes κ′ (mi) e−R(t,ξ) = γi. If we assume γi > 0, equation (5.6)
implies mi > 0, contradicting equation (5.7). Thus, γi = mi = 0. 
Corollary 12. If f (l) < y and mi > 0, then xi j = 0 for all j.
Figure 5.1 shows the case of Mi = 2.
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λi1
λi2
O
xi1 = 0xi1 = X
xi2 = 0
xi2 = X
mi > 0
−φi1
φi2
mi = 0
(a) Off demand constraints
ˆλ1
ˆλ2
x1 = 0
x2 > 0
x1 > 0
x2 = 0
(m > 0 for all ˆλ1 and ˆλ2)
f1
f2
grad m
grad m
ˆλ2 =
f2
f1
ˆλ1
x1 = x2 = 0
m is constant for all λ’s in this region.
x1 = X
x2 = 0
x1 = 0
x2 = X
O
ˆλ2 =
f2
f1
ˆλ1 +
1
φ2
κ′
(
σ1 f1 l1+σ2 f2 l2
φ1 f1+φ2 f2
)
ˆλ2 =
f2
f1
ˆλ1 +
1
φ2
κ′
(
σ1 f1 l1+σ2 f2 l2+ f1X
φ1 f1+φ2 f2
)
ˆλ2 =
f2
f1
ˆλ1 −
f2
φ1 f1 κ
′
(
σ1 f1 l1+σ2 f2 l2+ f2X
φ1 f1+φ2 f2
)
ˆλ2 =
f2
f1
ˆλ1 −
f2
φ1 f1 κ
′
(
σ1 f1 l1+σ2 f2 l2
φ1 f1+φ2 f2
)
A
B
C
D
A
B
C
D
(b) On demand constraints
Figure 5.1: Optimal control
(b) On demand constraints. When the demand constraint (5.3) is binding, it imposes restrictions on controls in
the form of
∑
i, j fi j ˙li j = y˙, or
(5.11)
∑
i

∑
j
φi j fi j
mi = y˙ +
∑
i, j
(
σi jli j + xi j
)
.
Since (5.11) is constraint expressed in differential form, the initial condition must be provided at the conjunction
time. However, given that the path is on the constraint surface in the neighborhood of the present time, (5.11)
suffices.
Proposition 13. Define ki
ab(λa, λb; l) := λia/ fia − λib/ fib.
(1) If ∑a φia fiakia j ≤ κ′i (m¯i) for all i and j where m¯i is a solution to
y˙ =
∑
i

∑
j
φi j fi j
 m¯i −
∑
i
∑
j
σi j fi jli j
∑
a φiaλia − κ
′
i (m¯i)∑
a φia fia
=
∑
a φi′aλi′a − κ
′
i′ (m¯i′ )∑
a φi′a fi′a
, ∀i, i′,
then m∗i = m¯i and xi j = 0 for all i and j.
(2) If set S := {(i, j) : ∑a φia fiakia j > κ′i (m¯i)} is non-empty, then mi is determined by
κ′i′ (mi′ ) =
∑
a
φi′a fi′a
(
λi′a
fi′a −
λi′ j
fi′ j
)
> κ′i′ (m¯i′) ∀i′ ∈ S
∑
a φiaλia − κ
′
i (m¯i)∑
a φia fia
=
∑
a φi′aλi′a − κ
′
i′(m¯i′ )∑
a φi′a fi′a
, ∀i < S .
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On the other hand, xi j = 0 for all (i, j) < S and xi′ j′ for all (i′, j′) ∈ S is given by
∑
(i′ , j′)∈S
fi′ j′ xi′ j′ =
∑
i

∑
j
φi j fi j
 m¯i −
∑
i
∑
j
σi j fi jli j − y˙
and distribution among xi′ j′’s is indeterminate.
Proof. Define Ai j := λi j − µ0 fi j. From (5.8),
xi j =

0 if Ai j > 0
[0, X] if Ai j = 0
X if Ai j < 0
Since X is sufficiently large, the condition x ≤ X is never binding, which implies that Ai j ≥ 0 for all i, j and thus∑
a φiaAia ≥ 0 for all i. Then, since γi = 0 for all i, κ′i (mi) =
∑
a φiaAia. Solving this obtains
(5.12) µ0 =
∑
a φiaλia − κ
′
i (mi)∑
a φia fia
for all i. First, suppose xi j = 0 for all i and j. (5.11) and (5.12) together with xi j = 0 determines mi which is
common for all range of xi j = 0 for all i, j for given l. Let us denote it by m¯i. Then, from Ai j ≥ 0, the condition
xi j = 0 for all i, j is equivalent to domain ∑a φia fiakia j ≤ κ′i (m¯i) for all i and j. Next, suppose that there exist some
i′ and j′ such that xi′ j′ > 0. Then, from µ0 = λi′ j′/ fi′ j′ ,
κ′i′ (mi′ ) =
∑
a
φi′a fi′a
(
λi′a
fi′a −
λi′ j′
fi′ j′
)
From the demand constraint (5.11), ∑i (∑a φia fia) (mi − m¯i) > 0. On the other hand, from (5.12), if mi R m¯i for
some i, then m j R m¯ j for any j. These leads to mi > m¯i for all i. 
Optimal control for each λ for the case of two undeclarable types is shown in Figure 5.1. |ki
ab| can be interpreted
as pressure that represents the necessity of structural change in employment composition between type a and b. If
the pressure is relatively weak, the structural change is achieved solely through the adjustment of new employment
and natural separation. As the pressure grows, the firm is compelled to adopt dismissal. The bandwidth of the
no-dismissal domain x1 = x2 = 0 positively depends on l’s. The linear structure of the optimal control on the
demand constraint shown in Figure 5.1 (b) is a direct consequence of the presence of the demand constraint.
If there exists infinitesimal transformation that preserves Hamiltonian, the first integral exists and it is actually
demand constraint. The following two theorems are related to our problem.
Theorem 14. The necessary and sufficient condition for function G to be the first integral of Hamiltonian dynamics
with Hamiltonian H is {G, H} = 0.
Theorem 15 (Noether’s Theorem). For function H defined on a simply-connected domain, the following two
statements are equivalent.
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λ1
λ2
f1
f2
grad m
grad m
λ2 =
f2
f1 λ1
O
A
B
C
D
A
B
C
D
The Hamiltonian of this vector field becomes the first integral in the
Hamiltonian field in the configuration space.
Figure 5.2: Vector field in the conjugate space brought by the demand constraint
(1) There exists a function G such that
(a) G is not a constant function and
(b) G satisfies {G, H} = 0.
(2) There exists a one-parameter group of transformation with parameter s, ϕs, such that
(a) ϕs is a canonical transformation,
(b) ϕs satisfies H ◦ ϕs = H and
(c) ϕs is not an identity transformation.
Obviously, the demand constraint G = f (l) − y = 0 is constant over time, so it is one of the first integrals.
Theorems 14 and 15 guarantee that we should be able to find ϕs that satisfies condition (2) in Theorem 15 from
which we can construct change of variables to facilitate dynamics on manifolds. To find such ϕs, the key findings
is that its projection on the conjugate subspace need to satisfy the following relationship:
(5.13)

Λ11
...
ΛLML

=

λ11
...
λLML

+

f11
...
fLML

s =: ϕs|λ
where (Λ11, . . . ,ΛLML ) is the costate vector after transformation, s is an arbitrary parameter and ϕs|λ denotes
the projection of transformation λ on subspace (λ11, . . . , λLML ). This is the transformation of variables along
contours shown in Figure 5.1 (b). Since the optimal control is invariant under this transformation, it also preserves
Hamiltonian. ϕs constructed in this way is obviously not an identity transformation. Therefore, remaining task is
to adjust ϕs|l to make ϕs a canonical transformation. This will be done in the next section. Another view is to look
at the vector field XG which equation (5.13) generates (see Figure 5.2). The vector field XG can be obtained by
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the infinitesimal transformation of this group which is
dϕs
ds
∣∣∣∣∣
s=0
=
∑
i, j
fi j ∂
∂λi j
where ∂/∂λi j is the basis of the tangent space. Then, it turns out that Hamiltonian G of the vector field XG is
actually G = f (l) − y.
5.2. Costate dynamics out of constraint surface. λ is an influence function which shows the impact of the
marginal change of the initial state value l on the present value of profits J. The properties of λ out of demand
surface is closely related to the presuppositions imposed on wage bargaining. When the demand constraint is
unbinding, it equals the discounted series of marginal profits of labor where discount rate is the sum of interest
rate and separation rate.
Proposition 16. Let te ∈ T e is the first entering time after t. Costate variables when the state constraint is not
binding is given by
(5.14) λi j(t) =
∫ te
t
 ∂ f∂li j −
L∑
k=1
∂cik
∂li j
 e− ∫ (r+σi)dξ +Ci j(te)
for all i, j where te = ∞ if T e = ∅.
Proof. Equations (5.9) with µ0 = 0 yields equation (5.14) with Ci undetermined. 
5.3. Costate dynamics on the constraint surface. Costate dynamics on the effective demand constraint can be
solved by focusing on “pressure to change employment structure” ki
ab. As mentioned above, this fact is no more
than the other side of the coin that the model has a demand constraint in the configuration space. Please observe
the symmetricity between canonically conjugate coordinates. The key is to apply the following transformation
Φ : Ω → ω to the model where Ω = t(L1, . . . , LL,Λ1, . . . ,ΛL), ω = t(l1, . . . , lL, λ1, . . . , λL), Li = t(Li1, . . . , LiMi ),
Λi =
t(Λi1, . . . ,ΛiMi ), li = t(li1, . . . , liMi ) and λi = t(λi1, . . . , λiMi ). Note that one can choose j∗(i) to make∑
a φia fiakia j∗(i) ≥ 0 for all i by taking j∗(i) = arg min j λi j/ fi j for given i:
Φ :

li1
...
li, j∗(i)
...
liMi

=

Li1
...
g(t, L)
...
LiMi

and

λi1
...
λi2
...
λiMi

=

Λi, j∗(i) + fi, j∗(i)Λi1
...
fi, j∗(i)Λi, j∗(i)
...
Λi, j∗(i) + fi, j∗(i)ΛiMi

for all i.
where g : R+ × · · ·×R+ → R+ is a function that satisfies y(t)− f (. . . , Li, j∗(i)−1, g(t, L), Li, j∗(i)−1, . . .) = Li, j∗(i). Notice
that this transformation belongs to the class of point transformation and therefore is a special case of canonical
transformation. Canonical transformation is defined to be the one the pull-back of which maps a second order
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differential form to itself and is known to preserve the Hamiltonian function.16 Point transformation is one of
canonical transformation in which the configuration subspace is transformed to itself.
The construction of Φ is easily observed by the following arguments. Suppose λi1/ fi1 = mina λia/ fia for given
i without loss of generality. We construct a point transformationΦ : (L;Λ) → (l; λ) = (ϕ(L); λ) such that
ϕ−1 :

Li1
Li2
...
LiMi

=

y(t) − f (l)
li2
...
liMi

or equivalently ϕ :

li1
li2
...
liMi

=

g(t, L)
Li2
...
LiMi

.
For it to be a point transformation, Hamiltonian must be invariant except for the “time-variant” term. Therefore,

Λi1
Λi2
...
ΛiMi

= tϕL

λi1
λi2
...
λiMi

=

− 1f1 0 · · · 0
−
f2
f1 1 O
...
. . .
−
fMi
f1 O 1


λi1
λi2
...
λiMi

=

−
λ1
f1
λ2 −
f2
f1 λ1
...
λMi −
fMi
f1 λ1

must hold, which implies 
λi1
λi2
...
λiMi

=

− f1Λ1
Λ2 + f2Λ1
...
ΛMi + fMiΛ1

.
Note that, with this choice of j∗(i), it becomes possible to make ∑a φiaΛia ≥ 0 so that the transformation does not
conflict with the limitation of κ′−1(·) that is defined only on domainR+. The Hamiltonian K on the new coordinates
is given by
K(t, L,Λ) = H(t,Φ(t, L,Λ)) −
〈
ϕt,
(
tϕL
)−1
Λ
〉
which simplifies to
(5.15) K = f
(
. . . , Li, j∗−1, g(t, L), Li, j∗+1, . . .
)
− c
(
. . . , Li, j∗−1, g(t, L), Li, j∗+1, . . .
)
−
∑
i
κi
mi

∑
a, j∗
φiaΛia

 +
∑
i
∑
a, j∗
Λia
φiam

∑
b, j∗
φibΛib
 − σiaLia
)
where m(·) := κ′−1(·). The equation does not contain Λ j∗ , showing that L j∗ is cyclic coordinate. Also, this consists
of an energy surface on which a path is restricted. With two kinds of undeclarable types, it fully characterizes
the solution. Note that λ j∗ is indeterminant on the demand surface without specifying by the leaving point or a
bounded steady state.
5.4. Costate discontinuity on junction points.
16For analytical mechanics, see e.g. Arnol’d (1989) and Ito (1998).
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Entering condition to the demand constraint. Let C ⊂ RM be a configuration space. Define an entering time
te ∈ R to a state constraint surface B ⊂ C such that the Lagrange variable µ0 adjoint to the state constraint B yields
µ0(te) = µ0(te−ε) = 0 and µ0(te+ε) > 0 for any arbitrarily small ε > 0. Let z(t) : R→ C be a path, i.e. a trajectory
projected onto the configuration space. Define z(te) as an entering point. Similarly, leaving time tl ∈ R from a
state constraint B is defined to be µ0(tl) = µ0(tl + ε) = 0 and µ0(tl − ε) > 0 for any arbitrarily small ε > 0. z(tl)
is called a leaving point. Denote a set of all entering time by T e and a set of all leaving time by T l. We also call
t j ∈ T e ∩ T l a junction time and z(t j) a junction point. In general, costate variables can show time-discontinuity
either at entering or leaving points (see e.g. Bryson et al. (1963)). This is due to the fact that, over time, the state
constraint separates the normal of intertemporal transformation of the neighborhood of the optimal trajectory on
the limiting surface at entering or leaving time from the normal of the limiting surface itself. Despite tha fact, for
the current problem, it turns out that costate variables are actually continuous both at entering and leaving time.
This is due to the one-way property of the path, i.e. as far as no external force is added on y, the path permanently
stays on the demand surface. At conjunction time t ∈ T e ∪ T l,
λ−ia = λ
+
ia + ρ fia(5.16)
H− = H+ + ρy˙(5.17)
must hold where ρ is a Lagrange variable adjoint to the state constraint f (l) − y = 0 and, for any variable A, we
denote A− := limt↑tJ A, A+ := limt↓tJ A. From (5.16),
ρ =
λ−ia − λ
+
ia
fia
for all i and a, which implies
(5.18) ∆kiab =
∆λia
fia −
∆λib
fib = 0
for all i, a and b such that a , b. It implies that costate variables jump at entering points along contour lines of m
as shown in Figure 5.1 so that ki
ab does not change. From (5.17),
∑
i, j
λ−i j
(
φi jm−i − σi jli j − x−i j
)
−
∑
i
κi
(
m−i
)
=
∑
i, j
λ+i j
(
φi jm+i − σi jli j − x+i j
)
−
∑
i
κi
(
m+i
)
+ ρy˙
Using (5.16), it turns out
∑
i
κi
(
m+i
)
−
∑
i
κi
(
m−i
)
−
∑
i, j
(
φi jλ−i j
) (
m+i − m
−
i
)
+
∑
i, j
(
x+i j − x
−
i j
)
λ−i j =

0 if t ∈ T e
ρ
(
y˙ − f1 ˙l+1 − f2 ˙l+2
)
if t ∈ T l
(5.19)
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Or, the same relation can be expressed as
∑
i
κ
(
m−
)
−
∑
i
κ
(
m+
)
−
∑
i, j
(
φi jλ−i j
) (
m− − m+
)
+
∑
i, j
(
x−i j − x
+
i j
)
λ−i j =

ρ
(
y˙ − f1 ˙l−1 − f2 ˙l−2
)
if t ∈ T e
0 if t ∈ T l
(5.19’)
Proposition 17. At both entering and leaving points, mi and λi j are continuous at mi = m¯i and at λi j ≥ 0. xi j is
continuous at xi j = 0 both at entering and leaving points when y˙ ≥ −
∑
i, j σi jli j. If y˙ < −
∑
i, j σi jli j, x+i j > 0 for
some (i, j) showing discontinuity at entering points. Also, entering time is characterized by
(5.20) κ′
(
m¯i(te)
)
=
∑
j
φi jλ−i j(te)
where te ∈ T e.
Proof. When t ∈ T e, λ−i j ≥ 0 for ∀i, j. If λ−i j < 0 for some i and j, then x−i j = X, which implies
∑
i, j fi j ˙l−i j ≪ y˙,
violating the entering condition ∑i, j fi j ˙l−i j > y˙. First, suppose λ−i j > 0 for some i and j. Then, (5.19) becomes
∑
i
κi
(
m+i
)
=
∑
i
κi
(
m−i
)
+
∑
i
κ′i
(
m−
) (
m+i − m
−
i
)
−
∑
i, j
x+i jλ
−
i j
when t ∈ T e. However, since κi is a convex function and x ≥ 0, the above relation is only possible when m+i = m−i
and x+i j = 0 for all i and j. On the other hand, if λ−i j = 0 for all i and j, (5.19) yields
∑
i κi(m+i ) =
∑
i κi(m−i ) = 0
and again mi is continuous at zero for all i. In this case, kiab(te) = λ+ia/ fia − λ+ib/ fib = λ−ia/ fia − λ−ib/ fib = 0 for all
i, a, b which implies xi j = 0 for all i, j as far as y˙ ≥ −∑i, j σi jli j by Proposition 13. If y˙ < −∑i, j σi jli j, some of xi j
are strictly positive according to (2) of Proposition 13. Setting m+i = m−i and x+i j = x−i j = 0 in (5.19’) gives ρ = 0
which implies that λi j is continuous for all i, j at λi j = λ−i j ≥ 0 from (5.16). At leaving points, (5.19’) becomes
∑
i
κi
(
m−i
)
=
∑
i
κi
(
m+i
)
+
∑
i
κ′i
(
m+i
) (
m−i − m
+
i
)
−
∑
i, j
x−i jλ
+
i j
when t ∈ T l, and since κ is a convex function and x ≥ 0, the above relation is only possible when m+i = m−i
and x−i j = 0 for all i and j. Putting these results in (5.19) gives us ρ = 0 which implies continuity of λi j for all
i, j at leaving time. (5.21) comes from the fact that κ′i
(
m−i (te)
)
=
∑
j φi jλ−i j(te) from (5.6), m+i (te) = m¯i(te) from
Proposition 13 and m−i (te) = m+i (te) from the above results. 
From Proposition 17, entering points locate in domain ∑a φia fiakia j ≤ κ′i (m¯i). It implies that the entering to the
demand constraint must be “smooth” in the configuration space if y˙ ≥ −∑i, j σi jli j. Namely, growth of labor must
slow down as employment approaches to the demand constraint.
Leaving condition from the demand constraint. Leaving points exist in the interior of ∑a φia fiakia j ≤ κ′i (m¯i). Note
that leaving from the demand constraint never occurs so far as y˙ ≤ 0. Leaving occurs when catchup to the growth
of demand becomes too costly in terms of accompanying vacancy cost. As y˙ becomes too large, it becomes
suboptimal to stick to the surface of the demand constraint. What happens is that as y˙ grows, the band B ≥ k ≥ C
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(∑a φia fiakia j ≤ κ′i (m¯i)) in Figure 5.1 widens while the width of other bands are kept constant. It implies that for
given k, it becomes more likely to fall in the domain B ≥ k ≥ C. Unless the value of y˙ is such that corresponding
optimal control keeps the state variables exactly on the surface of the demand constraint, as soon as k falls in the
domain B ≥ k ≥ C, the state variables leaves the demand constraint. The leaving is more likely to happen if |k| is
small.
Proposition 18. Leaving time is characterized by
(5.21) κ′
(
m¯i(tl)
)
=
∑
j
φi jλ+i j(tl)
where tl ∈ T l. Leaving points satisfy the condition ∑a φia fiakia j < κ′i (m¯i).
Proof. From Proposition 18 and y˙(tl) > 0, m and x are continuous at tl and xi j(tl) = 0 for all i, j, from which (5.21)
is derived. From Proposition 18, ∑a φia fiakia j ≤ κ′i (m¯i) must hold at t = tl. Also, from (5.6) and y˙(tl) > 0, λ+i j > 0
must hold for some i, j. Suppose ∑a φia fiakia j = κ′i (m¯i). Then, for any i, j, ∑a φia fia (λia/ fia − λi j/ fi j) = ∑a φiaλia
holds which implies λi j = 0 for any i, j. This is a contradiction. 
6. Rationale ofWage Function
λ is an influence function of l on J which is the value of the optimand in the maximization problem for a firm.
To derive the wage function in Section 3 and 4, however, we need to know the marginal impact of change in l on
F(l) =
∫ ∞
t
 f −∑
i
κi
 e−Rdξ
instead of J, when l follows the optimal employment path for a firm. Actually, it can be shown that a new
“influence” function of l on F can be constructed based on the derivation of λ. Denote the new influence function
by λ∗. The above equation can be rewritten as
(6.1) F(l) =
∫ ∞
t
(
H + c + ˙λ∗ · l
)
e−Rdξ − λ∗(∞) · l(∞) + λ∗(t) · l(t) +
∑
t∈T e∪T l
ρ (y − f )
using the new costate variable λ∗. Taking total derivative,
δF =
∫ ∞
t
[(
∂H
∂l +
∂c
∂l +
˙λ
∗
)
δl(ξ) + ∂H
∂u
δu(ξ)
]
d−R dξ − λ∗(∞) · δl(∞) + λ∗(t) · δl(t)
holds at all t where u = (m, x). We want to set λ∗ so that we can neglect the effect of δl(ξ) (t < ξ < ∞) on δF.
Then, dynamics of λ∗ should be given by
(6.2) ˙λ∗ = −∂H
∂l −
∂c
∂l =
˙λ −
∂c
∂l
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both on and off the demand surface. The new λ∗(t) which follows the above dynamics is the “influence” of l upon
the payoff of the total coalition, since λ∗(t) = δF/δl(t). It implies that, off the demand surface,
(6.3) λ∗i j =
∫ te
t
fi j e−
∫
(r+σi j)ds +C
from µ0 = 0 in equation (5.9). In the wage bargaining, marginal impact of the decrease in the number of coalitional
members matters. Note that when an agent leaves the coalition, demand constraint becomes unbinding even if it
was initially binding. Therefore, regardless whether demand constraint is binding, (6.3) shows marginal impact of
dli j < 0.
Theorem 19. F is increasing and concave in domain {(˜l11, . . . , ˜lLML ) : 0 ≤ ˜li j ≤ li j}.
Proof. We only need to consider δli j < 0 which leads the state constraint unbinding. Increasing property results
from the following facts: 1) λi j(t) ≥ 0 for any t when it is on the demand constraint, since λi j < 0 makes xi j = X
and resulting ˙li j makes the path detached from the surface. 2) Moreover, since λi j is continuous on junction points,
Ci j(te) ≥ 0 holds in equation (5.14). Therefore, λi j ≥ 0. 3) From (5.9) and (6.2), ∂F/∂li j = λ∗i j ≥ λi j ≥ 0.
Along the optimal path, dλ/dt < 0 and thus dm/dt < 0. Together with transition equation (2.1), they imply
dli j(τ) ≤ e−
∫ τ
t
σdli j(t) for all τ > t around the optimal path. Then, from equation (6.3),
∑
i, j
∂F
∂li j(t)dli j(t) =
∑
i, j
λ∗i jdli j(t)
=
∑
i, j
(∫ te
t
∂ f
∂l(τ)e
−
∫
(r+σ)dτ +C
)
dli j(t)
≥
∑
i, j
(∫ te
t
∂ f
∂l(τ)e
−
∫
rdτ +C
)
dli j(t)
=
∫ te
t
d f e−
∫
rdτ +C
≥ dF
where C ≥ 0 is constant and this shows concavity of F. 
Theorem 19 shows that F satisfies the condition of a3 in section 3. Namely, the bargaining game assumed in
section 3 is actually consistent with the whole model. The next theorem completes the argument that there will
be excess demand for labor if the demand constraint is unbinding which is the source of the (modified) principle
of effective demand. Since increase of labor always amplifies profit of firm, it is always willing to accommodate
additional potential demand as far as it is smaller than the unbounded steady state level.
Theorem 20. If the demand constraint is unbinding and l is smaller than the unbounded steady state, dJ/dl > 0.
Moreover, if ∂F/∂t∂li j − ˙Ui ≤ 0, then wi j(t) < ∂ f (t)/∂li j for all (i, j) ∈ Υ and t.
Proof. The first statement is obvious from the fact that λi j > 0 for all i, j when the demand constraint is unbinding
and l is smaller than the unbounded steady state. The second statement comes from the following. From ∂F/∂li =
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λ∗i ,
˙λ∗i j = − fi j + (r + σi j)λ∗i j. Equation (4.6) yields
fi j − wi j =
(
wi j − bi
)
+ σiλ
∗
i j + µi
∫ ∞
t
Eh [wih − bi] e−
∫
αds − 2σi(Ei j − Ui)
=
(
wi j − bi
)
+ µi
∫ ∞
t
Eh [wih − bi] e−
∫
αi ds + σiUi
> 0
where the second line is obtained using Ei j − Ui = (λ∗i j − Ui)/2 and the last inequality comes from Proposition 9
and Proposition 10. 
7. Steady State on the Demand Surface
The model allows for analysis of a perpetually moving economy by truncating the economy in sufficiently
distant future. However, to settle down the endpoint of costate variables, it is sometimes convenient to analyze the
steady state. The previous analyses showed that unless there is coordinated expectation among economic agents
which persists for infinite length of time, the economy will not reach to the unbounded steady state. On the other
hand, the economy can be settled in a steady state on the stationary demand constraint. Suppose y˙ = 0 in this
section. Then, we find out strictly positive amount of rejection of job application at steady state “almost surely”.
A bounded steady state maximizes profits obtainable when initial state of labor can be directly chosen. Consider
the following static problem.
(P’) max
l,m,x
 f (l) − w (l) · l −
L∑
i=1
κi(mi)

subject to
φi jmi = (r + σi j)li j + xi j, ∀i, j(2.1’)
y = f (l)(5.3’)
Theorem 21. Steady-state solution of problem (P) is equivalent to the solution of (P’).
Proof. The optimality condition of the problem (P’) is given by
κ′i (mi) =
∑
j
φi j ˆλi j(5.6’)
ˆλi j =
fi j − ci j
r + σi j
− µˆ0
fi j
r + σi j
(5.9’)
xi j =

0 if ˆλi j > 0
X if ˆλi j < 0
(5.10’)
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and the constraints where ˆλi j and µˆ0 are costate variables adjoint to equations (2.1’) and (5.3’), respectively. From
(5.6’) and (5.9’),
(7.1) µˆ0 =
∑
j
φi j
r+σi j
( fi j − ci j) − κ′i (mi)∑
j
φi j
r+σi j
fi j
Since X is arbitrarily large and therefore the steady state condition for li j does not hold when xi j = X, ˆλi j < 0 is
impossible for all i. Thus, ˆλi j > 0 or ˆλi j = 0. If there exist (i, j) such that ˆλi j = 0, then for such (i, j)’s
(7.2) µˆ0 =
fi j − ci j
fi j ∀(i, j),
ˆλi j = 0
and for other (i, j)’s such that ˆλi j > 0,
(7.3) xi j = 0 ∀(i, j), ˆλi j > 0
holds. Then, the solution is completely characterized by (2.1’), (5.3’), (7.1), (7.2) and (7.3).
On the other hand, the bounded steady state solution to the original problem (P) is given by imposing steady
state condition ˙l = ˙λ = ˙fi j = 0 to each optimal condition. Imposing it on (2.1) and (5.3) obtains the same condition
as (2.1’) and (5.3’). From (5.9) and the steady state conditions,
(5.9”) λi j =
fi j − ci j
r + σi j
+ µ0
σi j fi j
r + σi j
.
Substituting this to (5.6) derives
(7.1’) µ0 =
∑
j
φi j
r+σi j
( fi j − ci j) − κ′i (mi)
r
∑
j
φi j
r+σi j
fi j
,
which is equivalent to (7.1) if we define µˆ0 = rµ0. From (5.9’) and (5.9”), λi j = ˆλi j + µ0 fi j, which results in
equivalence relation between
xi j =

0 if Ai j > 0
[0, X] if Ai j = 0
in problem (P) ⇐⇒ xi j =

0 if ˆλi j > 0
[0, X] if ˆλi j = 0
in problem (P’).
All of the above equivalences show that problem (P’) is equivalent to problem (P). 
The next theorem shows that, in general, the point in which long-run profit is maximized does not coincide with
the point in which a bounded steady state is achieved with no-firing. It means that either dismissal or rejection of
job application will occur at a bounded steady state.
Theorem 22. If maxi Mi ≥ 2, the set of parameters (φ, σ) that brings xi j = 0 for all (i, j) at steady state has
measure zero in the parameter space for given f and κ.
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Proof. From Theorem 21, the proposition can be proved via problem (P’). x which appears in (P’) can be viewed
as a slack variable substituting equality of equation (2.1’) with inequality. Namely, it is equivalent to the following
problem:
(P”) min
l,m
w(l) · l +
L∑
i=1
κi(mi)

subject to
φi jmi ≥
(
r + σi j
)
li j, ∀i, j(2.1”)
y = f (l)(5.3’)
Obviously, mi maximizes the maximand when it is set to mi = min j{(r+σi j)li j/φi j} in equation (2.1”). Maximiza-
tion on l with this condition completely determines solution for l. However, in general,
r + σi j
φi j
li j ,
r + σi j′
φi j′
li j′
for any j′ , j, making xi j′ > 0 for any j′ such that j′ , arg min j{(r + σi j)li j/φi j}. Even when the condition
(7.4) r + σi j
φi j
li j =
r + σi j′
φi j′
li j′
for all j, j′, i holds, it fails to hold once any small perturbation is added on one of r,σ or φ keeping other parameters.
Namely, a set of parameters which satisfies (7.4) does not contain inner points, which implies that it has zero
measure in the parameter space when
∑L
i=1 Mi ≥ 2. 
The above theorem shows that dismissal or rejection of application generically occurs at least in one of the
labor types not only in transition on the demand constraint surface but also at steady state, when there exist more
than two labor types in the economy.
Figure 7.1 shows typical dynamics toward steady state when L = 1 and M1 = 2. Paths starting from initial
points A1 and A2 converge to a steady state C via entering points B1 and B2, respectively, when steady state demand
level is y1. If the demand shifts up unexpectedly to y = y2 in neighborhood of C, the path starts to move toward
the new demand surface and after counterclockwise entering, it continues with zero dismissal until it crosses a line
which passes through the origin. After crossing over the line, it starts to dismiss type 1 workers and converges to
the new bounded steady state D.
8. A Note on Demand forWorking Capital and the Rate of Interest
One of characteristics peculiar to search models is that firms are required to put “advances”. Especially, when
l = 0, they must find a way to finance those advances, as the classics used to assume. Let us assume firms demand
for working capital for this reason. Since λ is higher when l is low, the demand for lending is higher for a smaller
firm with unbounded demand. On the other hand, at a bounded steady state, required m and therefore necessary
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l1
l2
O
Iso-profit curves
(Unbounded steady state)Iso-quant curves
A1 B1
C
D
y = y1
y = y2
A2
B2
y˙ = 0 is assumed in the above graph.
Figure 7.1: Typical trajectories and effect of unexpected shift of demand constraint
working capital κ(m) are higher when y is higher. This observation provides two contradicting tendencies de-
pending on whether or not the demand constraint is binding. Suppose that firms are homogeneous and supply
of working capital is constant. If the demand constraint is unbinding in the economy, interest rate gradually de-
creases as the economy grows. On the other hand, comparing two economies staying at bounded steady states
with different level of y, the rate of interest is higher for the developed economy than the other. This fact may
explain so-called allocation paradox (Lucas (1990); Gourinchas and Jeanne (2007)). Even though our model did
not introduce physical capital, if capital should be interpreted as a fund to cover the set-up cost, the same logic can
be applied in an extended model.17 Under the presence of friction, the state of coordinated expectation critically
affects the equilibrium rate of interest.
9. Concluding Remarks
This paper showed that if there is search friction representable by a convex vacancy cost function ——however
small for a given amount of hiring——, the economy obeys the effective demand principle. Wage rate is always
smaller than marginal productivity, and a direct attempt to lower wage rate will not remove unemployment, as the
old Keynesian arguments suggest. It should be noted that any kinds of sticky price is not assumed in this model.
The existence of convex vacancy cost prohibits convergence to an unbounded steady state, or an equilibrium in the
long run, without persistent coordination of expectation. Wage rate is flexible reflecting redundant resources in
the labor market. One of the important consequences of the search theory is that, when search friction is present,
Keynes’s first postulate of classicals —the wage is equal to the marginal product of labour— must be abandoned
on a rational basis. This paper showed that, together with convex vacancy cost, it also rejects the second postulate
in a literal sense: the utility of wages when a given volume of labour is employed is equal to the marginal disutility
of that amount of employment. Instead, the second postulate is maintained in a broader sense that workers follow
17If there is no genuine working capital, those financial and physical capitals coincide.
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their optimal choice, on a boundary. Workers’ optimal behavior is to work more below unbounded steady states,
but such behavior is bounded by limited working opportunities. Anyway, this partial rejection of the second
postulate enables involuntary unemployment — not by secular interpretation, but in the original definition: men
are involuntarily unemployed if, in the event of a small rise in the price of wage-goods relatively to the money-
wage, both the aggregate supply of labour willing to work for the current money-wage and the aggregate demand
for it at that wage would be greater than the existing volume of employment (Keynes (1936, p.15)). Since wage
bargaining is based on rational expectation on both sides, there is no built-in mechanism which brings the economy
back to a natural level of output nor natural rate of unemployment. If there is a tendency toward full employment,
it must be pursued in exogenous factors from the model presented here. One of important factors excluded from
our model is the possibility for workers to escape to autarky. This can affect long-run unemployment rate and can
be a source of poverty trap.
In search models, profit of a firm is strictly positive even when the commodity market is competitive. The fact
that an entrepreneur earns non-zero profit and that he has massive power in bargaining as suggested in this paper
raises a fundamental question that who really is the “entrepreneur”. The question cannot be neglected when one
undertakes explicit specification of demand side because it affects the distribution of income and potentially the
level of investment. There can be two most straightforward but extreme ways of extension: one is to assume that
income level has no impact on pattern of consumption and investment. The other is to assume that there are two
classes, workers and entrepreneurs in a Kaldorian way. The latter literally assumes that the entrepreneur (and
his successor) embodies all the knowledge needed to manage firm and it will never be transferred to workers.
However, as many examples show, even family successors must learn management as workers before he succeeds
the company. This fact shows that much complicated internal forces are working in firms’ organization.
Appendix A. Distribution of Coefficients of (3.3)
Proposition 23. Let (ζ1, . . . , ζN) ∈ NN be a vector of parameters. For any yi ∈ N such that 0 ≤ yi ≤ ζi, define
(A.1) Υ(y1, . . . , yN ; ζ1, . . . , ζN) := 11 +∑Ni=1 ζi
∏M
i=1
(
ζi
yi
)
(∑M
i=1 ζi∑M
i=1 yi
)
Then, equation (A.1) is a probability mass function.
Proof. Υ ≥ 0 is obvious. If we sum it up for all xi, it becomes
∑
Υ =
1
1 +
∑N
i=1 ζi
ζ1∑
y1=0
· · ·
ζM∑
yM=0
∏N
i=1
(
ζi
yi
)
(∑N
i=1 ζi∑N
i=1 yi
)
=
1
1 +
∑N
i=1 ζi
∑
ζi∑
k=0
∑
{yi:
∑N
i=1 yi=k}
∏N
i=1
(
ζi
yi
)
(∑N
i=1 ζi
k
)
=
1
1 +
∑N
i=1 ζi
∑
ζi∑
k=0
∑
∑
yi=k
Mult.Hypg.(y1, . . . , yN ; k; ζ1, . . . , ζN)
PRODUCTION THEORY WITH CONVEX LABOR FRICTION 35
= 1
where Mult.Hypg.(y1, . . . , yN ; k; ζ1, . . . , ζN) is a multivariate hypergeometricdistribution with parameter (k; ζ1, . . . , ζN).
It sums up to one if all ni’s are summed up keeping
∑
ni = k. 
Proposition 24. Define a density function ˜Υ : RN → R characterized by Υ such that
(A.2) ˜Υ(x1, . . . , xN) dl1 · · ·dlN = Υ(y1, . . . , yN)
where xi = yidli and 0 ≤ xi ≤ li where li is fixed for any ζi and dli keeping li = ζidli (i = 1, . . . , N). Then, the
functional form of ˜Υ is given by
˜Υ(x1, . . . , xN) = δ
(
1 − x1l1
, . . . , 1 − xNlN
)
as ζi → ∞ for all i where δ denotes Dirac’s delta, i.e.
δ(z1, . . . , zN) =

∞ if ∀i, zi = 0
0 otherwise
and
(A.3)
∫ 1
0
· · ·
∫ 1
0
δ(z1, . . . , zN) dz1 · · · dzN = 1.
Proof. From Proposition 23,
ζ1∑
y1=1
· · ·
ζN∑
yN=1
Υ (y1, . . . , yN) = 1.
Using (A.2), it means
l1∑
x1=dl1
· · ·
lN∑
xN=dlN
˜Υ (x1, . . . , xN) dl1 · · ·dlN = 1
which leads to show ˜Υ satisfies property (A.3) as ζi → ∞, i.e. dli → 0, for all i. Note that

M∏
i=1
ζi


M∏
i=1
(
ζi
yi
) = o

(∑M
i=1 ζi∑M
i=1 yi
)
if there exists i such that yi < ζi. Then, (A.2) becomes
˜Υ(l1, . . . , lN) = 11 +∑Ni=1 ζi
∏M
i=1
(
ζi
yi
)
(∑M
i=1 ζi∑M
i=1 yi
) 1dl1 · · · dlN
=
1∏N
i=1 li
1
1 +
∑N
i=1 ζi
(∏N
i=1 ζi
) (∏M
i=1
(
ζi
yi
))
(∑M
i=1 ζi∑M
i=1 yi
) → 0
as ζi → ∞ for all i if there exists i such that yi < ζi. On the other hand, if yi = ζi for all i, we have
∏M
i=1
(
ζi
yi
)
= 1
and thus
Υ(ζ1, . . . , ζN) = 11 +∑Ni=1 ζi .
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Then, from (A.2),
˜Υ(l1, . . . , lN) = 11 +∑Ni=1 ζi
1
dl1 · · · dlN
=
1∏N
i=1 li
∏N
i=1 ζi
1 +
∑N
i=1 ζi
.
The second fraction diverges as ζi’s become large, therefore ˜Υ(l1, . . . , lN) → ∞ as ζi → ∞ for all i. 
Appendix B. A Property of Essentially Concave Game
Below is the proof of Lemma 3 in section 3.
Lemma 25 (Lemma 3). If game (Ω, v) is concave or essentially concave in which players are partitioned by
groups such that Ω = ⋃Mi=1 S i and ⋂Mi=1 S i = ∅, then for any S , T ⊆ Ω such that S ⊂ T, the following inequality
holds.
v(T ) − v(T \ S ) ≥
n∑
i=1
‖S ∩ S i‖
[
v(T ) − v
(
T \ {si( j)}
)]
Proof. We use the fact that v(T ) − v(T \ S ) has common value regardless of how players of S are removed
from T . Define Si1 i2···im (ni1 , . . . , nim ) :=
⋂
k={1,...,m:nik,0}
⋂nik
j=1
{
sik ( j)
}
where 1 ≤ m ≤ M and 1 ≤ ni ≤ Ni. When
nik = 0 for all k, define Si1 i2···im (0 · · ·0) = ∅ for convenience. Then, since T \ Si1···im (N1, . . . , NM−1) ⊃ T \
Si1···im (N1, . . . , , NM−1, nm), from concavity,
v(T ) − v(T \ S )
=
Nk∑
nk=1
[
v
(
T \Sk(nk − 1)
)
− v
(
T \Sk(nk)
)]
+
Ni2∑
ni2=1
[
v
(
T \S1i2 (N1, ni2 − 1)
)
− v
(
T \S1i2 (N1, ni2)
)]
+ · · · +
NiM∑
niM=1
[
v
(
T \S1i2 ···iM (N1, . . . , NiM−1 niM − 1)
)
− v
(
T \S1i2···iM (N1, . . . , NiM−1 , niM )
)]
≥ M
Nk∑
nk=1
[
v
(
T \Sk(nk − 1)
)
− v
(
T \Sk(nk)
)]
Summing up the above inequality for all k = 1, . . . , M,
v(T ) − v(T \ S ) ≥
M∑
k=1
Nk∑
nk=1
[
v
(
T \Sk(nk − 1)
)
− v
(
T \Sk(nk)
)]
≥
M∑
k=1
‖S ∩ S k‖
[
v(T ) − v
(
T \
{
sk( j)
})]
for any j = 1, . . . , Nk since T \Si1···im (N1, . . . , Nm−1, nm − 1) ⊃ T \ Si1···im (N1, . . . , Nm−1, nm). 
Appendix C. Wage Function in a General case
In this section, the case is handled in which worker separation rates are not common for all type of workers. The
following approach can be used not only to obtain an explicit functional form but also for numerical calculations.
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The Bellman equations (2.4) and (2.5) are equivalent to
Ui(t) = Eξ
[∫ ξ
t
bi(τ) e−
∫ τ
t r dτ + E jEi j(ξ) e−
∫ ξ
t r
]
Ei j(t) = Eξ
[∫ ξ
t
wi j(τ) e−
∫ τ
t
r dτ + Ui(ξ) e−
∫ ξ
t
r
]
in integral forms, where Eξ is an expectation operator on ξ. Using partial integration, they simplify to
Ui(t) =
∫ ∞
t
(
bi(ξ) + µi(ξ)E jEi j(ξ)
)
e−
∫ ξ
t
(r+µi) dξ(C.1)
Ei j(t) =
∫ ∞
t
(
wi j(ξ) + σi j(ξ)U(ξ)
)
e−
∫ ξ
t
(r+σi j) dξ(C.2)
where σi j(ξ) 9 0 and y(ξ) 9 0 as ξ → +∞ are assumed. If σi j 9 0 and y 9 0, then µ 9 0, since replacement
demand for labor does not vanish. We leave r arbitrary but only assumed to be integrable. They guarantee existence
of U and E. (C.1) and (C.2) are singular Volterra integral equations of the second kind and have a structure of
Vi(t) −
∫ ∞
t
Ki(t, ξ) Vi(ξ) dξ = hi(t)(C.3)
where Vi(t) = t(Ui(t), Ei1(t), . . . , EiMi(t)), the integral kernel Ki is given by
Ki =

Ki00 Ki01 · · · Ki0Mi
Ki10 Ki11 · · · Ki1Mi
...
...
. . .
...
KiMi0 KiMi1 · · · KiMi Mi

=

0 g1µi(ξ) e−
∫ ξ
t
µi · · · gMiµi(ξ) e−
∫ ξ
t
µi
σ˜i1(ξ) e−
∫ ξ
t
σ˜i1
... O
σ˜iMi (ξ) e−
∫ ξ
t
σ˜iMi

e−
∫ ξ
t
r
and the exceptional part h is given by18
hi =

hi0
hi1
...
hiMi

=

∫ ∞
t
bi(ξ) e−
∫ ξ
t
(r+µi) dξ∫ ∞
t
wi1(ξ) e−
∫ ξ
t
(r+σi1) dξ
...∫ ∞
t
wiMi (ξ) e−
∫ ξ
t
(r+σiMi ) dξ

The following proposition can be derived.
Proposition 26. The solution to the simultaneous equations (C.3) is given by
Vi(t) = hi(t) +
∫ ∞
t
Gi(t, ξ) hi(ξ) dξ
where Gi is a Neumann series matrix in which Gipq(t, ξ) := ∑∞ζ=1 ∗Kζipq(t, ξ) (p, q = 1, . . . , Mi), provided that
Gipq(t, ξ) uniformly converges.
18Subscript i is sometimes omitted below when obvious.
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The composition of (0, 0)-kernel is given by
∗
K200(t, ξ) =
Mi∑
ζ=0
(
K0ζ ∗ Kζ0
)
(t, ξ) =
Mi∑
ζ=1
(
K0ζ ∗ Kζ0
)
(t, ξ)
= e−
∫ ξ
t
r
∫ ξ
t
µ(τ) e−
∫ τ
t
µi

Mi∑
ζ=1
giζσ˜iζ(ξ) e−
∫ ξ
τ
σ˜iζ
 dτ
The integral part equals the expected probability that an unemployed worker as of time t is employed afterwards
and separates again exactly at time ξ where expectation is taken for possible undeclarable types. Other cross-
compositions are given by
∗
K20ζ(t, ξ) =
∗
K2ζ0 = 0, ∀ζ = 1, . . . , Mi
∗
K2pq(t, ξ) =
∫ ξ
t
Kp0K0q = Kp0 ∗ K0q ∀{(p, q) | p ≥ 1 ∨ q ≥ 1}
The iterated kernels alternate between zero and strictly positive numbers depending on whether the multiplicity of
the iteration is odd or even. That is

∗
K2n00 · · ·
∗
K2n0Mi
...
. . .
...
∗
K2nMi0 · · ·
∗
K2nMi Mi

=

∗
K2n00 0 · · · 0
0
...
... · · · Kp0 ∗
∗
K2n00 ∗ K0q · · ·
0
...

and

∗
K2n−100 · · ·
∗
K2n−10Mi
...
. . .
...
∗
K2n−1Mi0 · · ·
∗
K2n−1Mi Mi

=

0
∗
K2(n−1)00 ∗
∗
K01 · · ·
∗
K2(n−1)00 ∗
∗
K0Mi
K10 ∗
∗
K2(n−1)00
... O
KMi0 ∗
∗
K2(n−1)00

for n = 1, 2, . . .
∗
K2n00 comprises of the core part of iteration in each element and
∗
K2n00 (t, ξ) = e−
∫ ξ
t
r
∫ ξ
t
dτn−1
∫ τn−1
t
dτn−2 · · ·
∫ τ2
t
(∫ τ1
t
A
) (∫ τ2
τ1
A
)
· · ·
(∫ ξ
τn−1
A
)
dτ1
where A := e
∫ ξ
t
r
∗
K200. The above can be interpreted as the expected discounted probability that an unemployed
worker as of time t repeats the cycle of employment and separation n-times in the period of (t, ξ] and the last
separation occurs exactly at time ξ. Summing up the above results for all n, we obtain Neumann series Gi j =
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∑∞
n=1
∗
K
n
i j:
G =

∑
n
∗
K2n00
∑
n
∗
K2(n−1)00 ∗
∗
K01 · · ·
∑
n
∗
K2(n−1)00 ∗
∗
K0Mi∑
n K01 ∗
∗
K2(n−1)00
...
... · · · Kp0 ∗
∑
n
∗
K2n00 ∗ K0q · · ·∑
n KMi0 ∗
∗
K2(n−1)00
...

.
Using these results, the explicit form of wage rate function is given by the following proposition.
Proposition 27. The wage rate of type-(i, j) worker as of time t is given by
wi j(t) = ωi j(t) +
Mi∑
k=1
∫ ∞
t

∞∑
n=1
∗
A
n
jk(t, ξ)
 e− ∫ (r+σi j)ωk(ξ) dξ
where
Ai j(t, ξ) := µ(t)
Mi∑
k=1
gk
∫ ξ
t
(
Gk j(t, τ) −G0 j(t, τ)
)
dτ − σi j(t)
∫ ξ
t
G0 j(t, τ)dτ
ωi j(t) :=
∂F(t)/∂li j + bi(t)
2
−
µi(t) − σi j(t)
2
∫ ∞
t
b(ξ) e−
∫
(r+µi)dξ
+
1
2
∫ ∞
t
A j0(t, ξ) b(ξ) e−
∫
(r+µi)dξ
for all i, j.
Proof. From Lemma 1, ˙Ei j =
[
˙Ui + ∂2F/(∂t ∂li j)
]
/2. Substituting each value function by the time-derivative of
the result of Proposition 26, we get
wi j(t) =
∂F/∂li j(t) + bi(t)
2
−
µi(t) − σi j(t)
2
h1 +
1
2
∫ ∞
t
A j0(t, ξ) bi(ξ) e−
∫
(r+µi) dξ(C.4)
+
1
2
Mi∑
k=1
∫ ∞
t
A jk(t, ξ) wk(ξ) e−
∫
(r+σi j)dξ
for all i, j. Solving simultaneous equation (C.4) obtains the result. 
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2 1 . 卸 売 業 の 経 営 と 戦 略 － － 卸 売 流 通 研 究 会 ﾋｱﾘ ﾝ ｸ ﾞ調 査 録 (1 ) :日 用 卸 売 流 通 研 究 会 Apr . 1 9 9 6
雑 貨 卸 売 企 業 （ 代 表 高 宮 城 朝 則 ）
22 . 卸 売 業 の 経 営 と 戦 略 － － 卸 売 流 通 研 究 会 ﾋｱﾘ ﾝ ｸ ﾞ調 査 録 (2 ) :食 品 ・ 卸 売 流 通 研 究 会 Apr . 1 9 9 6
酒 類 卸 売 企 業 （ 代 表 高 宮 城 朝 則 ）
23 . A N o t e o n t h e I m p a c t s o f P r i c e S h o c k s o n W a g e i n U n i o n i z e d L a i x u n Z h a o M a y 1 9 9 6
E c o n o m i e s
2 4 . T r a n s f e r P r i c i n g a n d t h e N a t u r e o f t h e s u b s i d i a r y f i r m L a i x u n Z h a o J u n . 1 9 9 6
2 5 . T h e I n c i d e n c e o f a T a x o n P u r e i n a n A l t r u i s t i c J u n - i c h i I t a y a S e p . 1 9 9 6
O v e r l a p p i n g G e n e r a t i o n s E c o n o m y
2 6 . ' S m a l l G o v e r n m e n t ' i n t h e 2 1 s t C e n t u r y H i r o s h i S h i b u y a S e p . 1 9 9 6
2 7 . C h a r a c t e r i s t i c s a n d R e f o r m s o f P u b l i c H e a l t h I n s u r a n c e S y s t e m T a k a s h i N a k a h a m a S e p . 1 9 9 6
i n J a p a n
2 8 . T h e R o l e o f L o c a l G o v e r n m e n t s i n U r b a n D e v e l o p m e n t P o l i c y Y o s h i n o r i A k i y a m a S e p . 1 9 9 6
2 9 . O p t i m a l T a x a t i o n a n d t h e P r i v a t e P r o v i s i o n o f P u b l i c G o o d s J u n - i c h i I t a y a O c t . 1 9 9 6
& D a v i d d e M e z a
& G a r e t h D . M y l e s
3 0 . C o m p a r i s o n o f A g r i c u l t u r a l P o l i c y i n t h e U . S . a n d t h e J a p a n T o s h i k a z u T a t e i w a O c t . 1 9 9 6
3 1 . U S H e a l t h I n s u r a n c e : T y p e s , P a t t e r n s o f C o v e r a g e a n d D w a y n e A . B a n k s O c t . 1 9 9 6
C o n s t r a i n t s t o R e f o r m
3 2 . I n t e r n a t i o n a l C a p i t a l F l o w s a n d N a t i o n a l M a c r o e c o n o m i c J a n e W . D ' A r i s t a O c t . 1 9 9 6
P o l i c i e s
3 3 . F i n a n c i a l L i b e r a l i z a t i o n a n d S e c u r i t i z a t i o n i n H o u s i n g S y n - y a I m u r a O c t . 1 9 9 6
F i n a n c e a n d t h e C h a n g i n g R o l e s o f t h e G o v e r n m e n t
3 4 . S o c i a l E f f i c i e n c y a n d t h e ' M a r k e t R e v o l u t i o n ' i n U S H o u s i n g G a r y D y m s k i O c t . 1 9 9 6
F i n a n c e & D o r e n e I s e n b e r g
3 5 . G o v e r n m e n t E x p e n d i t u r e a n d t h e B a l a n c e o f P a y m e n t s : B u d g e t H i r o s h i S h i b u y a N o v . 1 9 9 6
D e f i c i t , F i n a n c i a l I n t e g r a t i o n , a n d E c o n o m i c D i p l o m a c y
3 6 . A H i s t o r y o f P B G C a n d I t s R o l e s C . D a v i d G u s t a f s o n N o v . 1 9 9 6
3 7 . D y n a m i c P r o v i s i o n o f P u b l i c G o o d s a s E n v i r o n m e n t a l T o s h i h i r o I h o r i M a r . 1 9 9 7
E x t e r n a l i t i e s & J u n - i c h i I t a y a
3 8 . A C o m p a r a t i v e S t a t i c A n a l y s i s o f t h e B a l a n c e d B u d g e t K o h S u m i n o M a r . 1 9 9 7
I n c i d e n c e i n t h e P r e s e n c e o f S e c t o r - S p e c i f i c U n e m p l o y m e n t
3 9 . A n E c o n o m e t r i c S t u d y o f T r a d e C r e a t i o n a n d T r a d e D i v e r s i o n i n M a s a h i r o E n d o h A p r . 1 9 9 7
t h e E E C , L A F T A a n d C M E A : A S i m p l e A p p l i c a t i o n o f t h e G r a v i t y M o d e l
4 0 . A D y n a m i c M o d e l o f F i s c a l R e c o n s t r u c t i o n T o s h i h i r o I h o r i A p r . 1 9 9 7
& J u n - i c h i I t a y a
4 1 . T h e J a p a n e s e W a y o f S o l v i n g F i n a n c i a l I n s t i t u t i o n F a i l u r e s O s a m u I t o J u l . 1 9 9 7
4 2 . T h e F e d e r a l R o l e i n C o m m u n i t y D e v e l o p m e n t i n t h e U . S . J a n e K n o d e l l O c t . 1 9 9 7
: E v o l u t i o n v s . D e v o l u t i o n
4 3 . R e n t - S e e k i n g B e h a v i o r i n t h e W a r o f A t t r i t i o n J u n - i c h i I t a y a O c t . 1 9 9 7
& H i r o y u k i S a n o
4 4 . ｻ ﾊ ﾘ ﾝ石 油 ・ ｶﾞ ｽ開 発 ﾌﾟ ﾛ ｼ ﾞ ｪ ｸ ﾄと 北 海 道 経 済 の 活 性 化 第 1号 北 東 ｱｼﾞ ｱ - ｻ ﾊ ﾘ ﾝ研 究 会 Ma y 1 9 9 8
4 5 . 購 買 部 門 の 戦 略 性 と 企 業 間 連 携 に つ い て 伊 藤 一 Jun . 1 9 9 8
4 6 . T h e F o r m a t i o n o f C u s t o m s U n i o n s a n d t h e E f f e c t o n G o v e r n m e n t M a s a h i r o E n d o h J u l . 1 9 9 8
P o l i c y O b j e c t i v e s
4 7 . T h e T r a n s i t i o n o f P o s t w a r A s i a - P a c i f i c T r a d e R e l a t i o n s M a s a h i r o E n d o h J u l . 1 9 9 8
4 8 . 地 域 型 ﾍﾞ ﾝ ﾁ ｬ ｰ支 援 ｼｽ ﾃ ﾑの 研 究 I－ 道 内 製 造 業 系 ﾍﾞﾝ ﾁ ｬ ｰ企 業 の ｹｰ ｽ ｽ ﾀ ﾃ ﾞ ｨ ｰ 地 域 経 済 社 会 ｼｽ ﾃ ﾑ研 究 会 Ju l . 1 9 9 8
日 本 開 発 銀 行 札 幌 支 店
49 . F i s c a l R e c o n s t r u c t i o n P o l i c y a n d F r e e R i d i n g B e h a v i o r T o s h i h i r o I h o r i A u g . 1 9 9 8
o f I n t e r e s t G r o u p s & J u n - i c h i I t a y a
5 0 . Q u e l l e n z u m M a r k w e s e n d e s O s n a b r c k e r L a n d e s i m N i e - S u s u m u H i r a i S e p . 1 9 9 8ü
d e r s c h s i s c h e n S t a a t s a r c h i v O s n a b r c k ( m i t S c h w e r p u n k tä ü
: V e r f a s s u n g , H l t i n g , S i e d l u n g u n d K o n f l i k t e n i m 1 7 . u n dö
1 8 . J a h r h u n d e r t )
5 1 . E q u i t y a n d C o n t i n u i t y w i t h a C o n t i n u u m o f G e n e r a t i o n s T o m o i c h i S h i n o t s u k a D e c . 1 9 9 8
5 2 . P u b l i c R e s o u r c e s A l l o c a t i o n a n d E l e c t i o n S y s t e m A k i h i k o K a w a u r a M a r . 1 9 9 9
D i s c u s s i o n P a p e r S e r i e s
C e n t e r f o r B u s i n e s s C r e a t i o n
O t a r u U n i v e r s i t y o f C o m m e r c e
5 3 . 消 費 者 の 価 格 ﾌﾟ ﾛ ﾓ ｰ ｼ ｮ ﾝ反 応 へ の 影 響 を 考 慮 し た 広 告 効 果 測 定 結 果 奥 瀬 喜 之 Jun . 1 9 9 9
ﾓ ﾃ ﾞ ﾙの 構 築
54 . 地 域 型 ﾍﾞ ﾝ ﾁ ｬ ｰ支 援 ｼｽ ﾃ ﾑの 研 究 Ⅱ -地 域 型 ﾍﾞ ﾝ ﾁ ｬ ｰ ･ ｲ ﾝ ｷ ｭ ﾍ ﾞ ｰ ｼ ｮ ﾝの 設 計 - 小 樽 商 科 大 学 ﾋﾞ ｼ ﾞ ﾈ ｽ創 造 Ju l . 1 9 9 9
ｾ ﾝ ﾀ ｰ & 日 本 開 発 銀 行 札
幌 支 店
55 . ｻ ﾊ ﾘ ﾝ石 油 ・ ｶﾞ ｽ開 発 ﾌﾟ ﾛ ｼ ﾞ ｪ ｸ ﾄと 北 海 道 経 済 の 活 性 化 第 2号 北 東 ｱｼﾞ ｱ - ｻ ﾊ ﾘ ﾝ研 究 会 Ma y 1 9 9 9
5 6 . D e c . 1 9 9 9石 鹸 洗 剤 ﾒｰｶ ｰに お け る ﾏｰｹ ﾃ ｨ ﾝ ｸ ﾞ ･ ﾁ ｬ ﾈ ﾙ行 動 の 変 遷 高 宮 城 朝 則
57 . D e c . 1 9 9 9長 期 的 取 引 関 係 に お け る 資 源 蓄 積 と 展 開 近 藤 公 彦 &坂 川 裕 司
58 . K o S u m i n o D e c . 1 9 9 9E x e r n a l i t i e s : A P i g o v i a n T a x v s . A L a b o r T a x
5 9 . A N e w D i m e n s i o n o f S e r v i c e Q u a l i t y : A n E m p i r i c a l S t u d y i n J a p a n . M a k o t o M a t s u o D e c . 1 9 9 9
& C a r o l u s P r a e t
& Y o s h i y u k i O k u s e
6 0 . A f t e r m a t h o f t h e F l i n t S i t - D o w n S t r i k e : G r a s s - R o o t s U n i o n i s m S a t o s h i T a k a t a M a r . 2 0 0 0
a n d A f r i c a n - A m e r i c a n W o r k e r s , 1 9 3 7 - 1 9 3 9
6 1 . T a r i f f i n d u c e d d u m p i n g i n t h e i n t e r m e d i a t e - g o o d m a r k e t C h i s a t o S h i b a y a m a A p r . 2 0 0 0
6 2 . D e r e g u l a t i o n , M o n i t o r i n g a n d O w n e r s h i p s t r u c t u r e : A C a s e A k i h i k o K a w a u r a A p r . 2 0 0 0
S t u d y o f J a p a n e s e B a n k s
6 3 . ｻ ﾊ ﾘ ﾝ石 油 ・ ｶﾞ ｽ開 発 ﾌﾟ ﾛ ｼ ﾞ ｪ ｸ ﾄと 北 海 道 経 済 の 活 性 化 第 3号 北 東 ｱｼﾞ ｱ - ｻ ﾊ ﾘ ﾝ研 究 会 Ap r . 2 0 0 0
6 4 . A C o o p e r a t i v e a n d C o m p e t i t i v e O r g a n i z a t i o n a l C u l t u r e , M a k o t o M a t s u o M a y 2 0 0 0
I n n o v a t i o n , a n d P e r f o r m a n c e : A n E m p i r i c a l S t u d y o f J a p a n e s e
S a l e s D e p a r t m e n t s
6 5 . F o r e i g n E x c h a n g e M a r k e t M a k e r ' s O p t i m a l S p r e a d w i t h R y o s u k e W a d a J u n . 2 0 0 0
H e t e r o g e n e o u s E x p e c t a t i o n s
6 6 . ダ ン ピ ン グ と ダ ン ピ ン グ 防 止 法 の 起 源 柴 山 千 里 Oct . 2 0 0 0
歴 史 的 文 脈 に お け る 「 不 公 正 貿 易 」 概 念 の 成 立
67 . T h e O r g a n i z a t i o n a l L e a r n i n g P r o c e s s : A R e v i e w M a k o t o M a t s u o D e c . 2 0 0 0
6 8 . T h e W e a k C o r e o f S i m p l e G a m e s w i t h O r d i n a l P r e f e r e n c e s : T o m o i c h i S h i n o t s u k a J a n . 2 0 0 1
I m p l e m e n t a t i o n i n N a s h E q u i l i b r i u m & K o j i T a k a m i y a
6 9 . 業 態 開 発 に お け る イ ノ ベ ー シ ョ ン と 競 争 － ビ ブ レ の ケ ー ス － 近 藤 公 彦 Jan . 2 0 0 1
7 0 . B u d g e t D i s t r i b u t i o n P r o b l e m T o m o i c h i S h i n o t s u k a F e b . 2 0 0 1
7 1 . 小 売 バ イ ヤ ー 組 織 の 機 能 と 顧 客 対 応 伊 藤 一 May 2 0 0 1
7 2 . T h e E f f e c t o f I n t r a - O r g a n i z a t i o n a l C o m p e t i t i o n o n K n o w l e d g e M a k o t o M a t s u o M a y 2 0 0 1
C r e a t i o n : C a s e S t u d y o f a J a p a n e s e F i n a n c i a l C o m p a n y
7 3 . ｻ ﾊ ﾘ ﾝ石 油 ・ ｶﾞ ｽ開 発 ﾌﾟ ﾛ ｼ ﾞ ｪ ｸ ﾄと 北 海 道 経 済 の 活 性 化 第 4号 北 東 ｱｼﾞ ｱ - ｻ ﾊ ﾘ ﾝ研 究 会 Ma r . 2 0 0 1
7 4 . T h e W e a k C o r e o f S i m p l e G a m e s w i t h O r d i n a l P r e f e r e n c e s : T o m o i c h i S h i n o t s u k a O c t . 2 0 0 1
I m p l e m e n t a t i o n i n N a s h E q u i l i b r i u m & K o j i T a k a m i y a
7 5 . 環 境 保 全 型 河 川 計 画 と 景 観 構 築 に 係 る 計 画 技 術 の 研 究 地 域 環 境 問 題 研 究 会 Oct . 2 0 0 1
（ 代 表 八 木 宏 樹 ）
76 . A d d i t i v i t y , B o u n d s , a n d C o n t i n u i t y i n B u d g e t D i s t r i b u t i o n T o m o i c h i S h i n o t s u k a D e c . 2 0 0 1
P r o b l e m
7 7 . M o n e t a r y P o l i c y i n B h u t a n : I m p l i c a t i o n s o f I n d i a n R u p e e A k i h i k o K a w a u r a D e c . 2 0 0 1
C i r c u l a t i o n
7 8 . O p t i m a l M u l t i o b j e c t A u c t i o n s w i t h C o r r e l a t e d T y p e s T o m o i c h i S h i n o t s u k a F e b . 2 0 0 2
& S i m o n W i l k i e
7 9 . ｻ ﾊ ﾘ ﾝ石 油 ・ ｶﾞ ｽ開 発 ﾌﾟ ﾛ ｼ ﾞ ｪ ｸ ﾄと 北 海 道 経 済 の 活 性 化 第 5号 北 東 ｱｼﾞ ｱ - ｻ ﾊ ﾘ ﾝ研 究 会 Ma r . 2 0 0 2
8 0 . T h e C a s e S t u d y o f R e t a i l B u y i n g O r g a n i z a t i o n H a j i m e I t o h M a r . 2 0 0 2
i n J a p a n e s e C o n t e x t
8 1 . 宿 泊 業 の サ ー ビ ス の サ ー ビ ス 構 成 要 素 に 関 す る 重 要 度 調 査 法 に 稲 葉 由 之 &沈 潔 如 &伊 藤 一 Feb . 2 0 0 3
関 し て の 一 考 察 北 海 道 へ の 台 湾 人 観 光 客 の 事 例 を 中 心 に
82 . ブ テ ィ ッ ク 経 営 に お け る 販 売 要 素 の 分 析 -AH Pに よ る 経 営 者 ・ 伊 藤 一 &橋 詰 敦 樹 Mar . 2 0 0 3
販 売 員 間 に お け る 重 要 度 認 識 比 較 に 関 す る 一 考 察 -
83 . 温 泉 地 に 対 す る イ メ ー ジ ギ ャ ッ プ に 関 す る 調 査 伊 藤 一 Mar . 2 0 0 3
8 4 . L i t e r a t u r e R e v i e w o n R e t a i l B u y e r f r o m R e s e a r c h H a j i m e I t o h
o n I n d u s t r i a l P u r c h a s i n g
8 5 . T h e C o m p a r i s o n S t u d y o n R e t a i l B u y e r B e h a v i o u r b e t w e e n U K , H a j i m e I t o h
A u s t r a l i a a n d J a p a n
8 6 . 社 会 科 学 研 究 の 基 礎 － 大 学 院 生 の た め の 研 究 法 － ダ ン ・ レ メ ニ イ 他 著 Mar . 2 0 0 2
抄 訳 稲 葉 由 之 &奥 瀬 善 之
&近 藤 公 彦 ＆ 玉 井 健 一
&高 宮 城 朝 則 &松 尾 睦
87 . マ ー ケ テ ィ ン グ 行 為 か ら み た 小 売 業 に よ る 需 要 創 造 坂 川 裕 司 May 2 0 0 2
－ 明 治 期 呉 服 店 の 経 営 行 為 を 考 察 対 象 と し て －
88 . I n t e r d e p e n d e n t U t i l i t y F u n c t i o n s i n a n I n t e r g e n e r a t i o n a l T o m o i c h i S h i n o t s u k a M a y 2 0 0 2
C o n t e x t
8 9 . I n t e r n a l a n d E x t e r n a l V i e w s o f t h e C o r p o r a t e R e p u t a t i o n H a j i m e I t o h F e b . 2 0 0 3
i n t h e J a p a n e s e H o t e l I n d u s t r y
9 0 . ｻ ﾊ ﾘ ﾝ石 油 ・ ｶﾞ ｽ開 発 ﾌﾟ ﾛ ｼ ﾞ ｪ ｸ ﾄと 北 海 道 経 済 の 活 性 化 第 6号 北 東 ｱｼﾞ ｱ - ｻ ﾊ ﾘ ﾝ研 究 会 Ma r . 2 0 0 3
小 売 購 買 行 動 研 究 に 関 す る 展 望91 .
坂 川 裕 司 May 2 0 0 3－ 「 買 い 手 視 角 」 で の 小 売 購 買 行 動 研 究 に 向 け て －
購 買 に お け る 「 情 報 シ ス テ ム の 逆 機 能 」92 .商 品
坂 川 裕 司 Sep . 2 0 0 3－ リ ス ク 回 避 的 バ イ ヤ ー に み る 合 理 性 と そ の 弊 害 －
93 . A n E x p e r i m e n t o f R o u n d - R o b i n T o u r n a m e n t b y E x c e l ' s M a c r o M a s a r u U z a w a A p r . 2 0 0 4
- U s i n g 1 6 0 S t u d e n t s ' D a t a f r o m C o u r n o t D u o p o l y G a m e -
9 4 . E a r n i n g s M a n a g e m e n t t h r o u g h D e f e r r e d T a x A s e e t s H i r o s h i O n u m a J u n . 2 0 0 4
- I n C a s e o f B a n k i n g C o m p a n y -
9 7 . C o m p e t i t i o n b e t w e e n M a t c h i n g M a r k e t s K o j i Y o k o t a M a y 2 0 0 5
9 8 . O n t h e r o l e o f a s y m m e t r i c i n f o r m a t i o n i n t h e a g g r e g a t e m a t c h i n g K o j i Y o k o t a A p r . 2 0 0 6
f u n c t i o n
9 9 . A n o t e o n O p t i m a l T a x a t i o n i n t h e P r e s e n c e o f E x t e r n a l i t i e s T o m o i c h i S h i n o t s u k a F e b . 2 0 0 5
& K o S u m i n o
1 0 0 . A N o t e o n J o n e s ' M o d e l o f G r o w t h M u t s u h i r o K a t o M a r . 2 0 0 5
1 0 1 . 整 数 ナ ッ プ サ ッ ク 問 題 が 多 項 式 時 間 で 解 け る 特 殊 な 場 合 を 飯 田 浩 志 Jul . 2 0 0 5
定 め る 条 件 に つ い て
10 2 . Ｉ Ｔ 技 術 者 の 熟 達 化 と 経 験 学 習 松 尾 睦 Sep . 2 0 0 5
1 0 3 . P r o d u c t D e - l i s t i n g b y R e t a i l B u y e r s : R e l a t i o n a l G a r y D a v i e s D e c . 2 0 0 5
A n t e c e d e n t s a n d C o n s e q u e n c e s & H a j i m e I t o h
1 0 4 . 米 国 地 域 経 営 史 に お け る 多 文 化 主 義 的 発 展 － １ ９ ３ ０ 年 代 ミ シ ガ ン 州 高 田 聡 May 2 0 0 6
フ リ ン ト に お け る ア フ リ カ 系 コ ミ ュ ニ テ ィ の 起 業 基 盤 を 中 心 に －
10 5 . 環 境 便 益 を 反 映 さ せ た 環 境 指 標 の 開 発 Dev e l o p i n g 山 本 充 Ap r . 2 0 0 6
a n e n v i r o n m e n t a l i n d i c a t o r i n c l u d i n g e n v i r o n m e n t a l b e n e f i t s
1 0 6 . A C r i t i c a l I n v e s t i g a t i o n o f L o n g - r u n P r o p e r t i e s o f E n d o g e n o u s M u t s u h i r o K a t o M a y 2 0 0 6
G r o w t h M o d e l s
1 0 7 . W h a t i s N a t i o n a l I n c o m e i n J o n e s ' M o d e l o f G r o w t h ? M u t s u h i r o K a t o J u n . 2 0 0 6
: A n E x p o s i t o r y A n n o t a t i o n
1 0 8 . A F u r t h e r A n a l y s i s o f t h e C o n s u m e r B e h a v i o r i n J o n e s ' M u t s u h i r o K a t o A u g . 2 0 0 6
R & D - B a s e d M o d e l o f E c o n o m i c G r o w t h
1 0 9． 看 護 師 の 経 験 学 習 プ ロ セ ス 松 尾 睦 Feb . 2 0 0 7
& 正 岡 経 子 & 吉 田 真 奈 美
& 丸 山 知 子 & 荒 木 奈 緒
11 0 . C o m m e n t s o n k n a p s a c k p r o b l e m s w i t h a p e n a l t y I i d a H i r o s h i M a r . 2 0 0 7
1 1 1 . 看 護 師 の 経 験 学 習 に 関 す る 記 述 的 分 析 松 尾 睦 Jul . 2 0 0 7
& 正 岡 経 子 & 吉 田 真 奈 美
& 丸 山 知 子 & 荒 木 奈 緒
11 2 . 頂 点 被 覆 へ の リ ス ト 減 少 法 の 解 析 に 関 す る 一 考 察 飯 田 浩 志 Dec . 2 0 0 7
1 1 3 . 小 中 学 校 に お け る 校 長 の 経 営 観 － 探 索 的 分 析 － 松 尾 睦 Dec . 2 0 0 7
1 1 4 . イ ン タ ビ ュ ー 調 査 ： 戦 後 復 興 期 大 阪 に お け る 自 転 車 部 品 製 造 業 者 ・ 田 中 幹 大 Apr . 2 0 0 8
問 屋 の 経 営 活 動
11 5 . P a r t i t i o nの あ る 風 景 飯 田 浩 志 Jun . 2 0 0 8
1 1 6 . M u l t i p r o d u c t F i r m s a n d D u m p i n g C h i s a t o S h i b a y a m a J u l . 2 0 0 8
& Y a s u n o r i I s h i i
1 1 7 . モ ス ク ワ の 低 層 住 宅 団 地 開 発 ― 2つ の ケ ー ス － 小 田 福 男 Mar . 2 0 0 9
1 1 8 . 整 数 ナ ッ プ サ ッ ク の 周 期 性 に つ い て 飯 田 浩 志 Mar . 2 0 0 9
1 1 9 . D i s c u s s i o n p a p e r s e r i e s n o . 1 1 8へ の 補 遺 飯 田 浩 志 Jul . 2 0 0 9
1 2 0 . 環 境 フ ィ ー ド バ ッ ク 効 果 を 考 慮 し た San d m oモ デ ル に よ る 二 重 配 当 角 野 浩 Jul . 2 0 0 9
仮 説 の 再 考 察
12 1 . 部 分 線 形 モ デ ル の 差 分 推 定 量 の 漸 近 理 論 劉 慶 豊 Oct . 2 0 0 9
1 2 2 . モ デ ル 平 均 理 論 の 新 展 開 劉 慶 豊 Oct . 2 0 0 9
1 2 3 . P r o d u c t i o n T h e o r y w i t h C o n v e x L a b o r F r i c t i o n : K o j i Y o k o t a D e c . 2 0 0 9
F o u n d a t i o n o f a n O p t i m a l N o n - m a r k e t - c l e a r i n g E c o n o m y
D i s c u s s i o n P a p e r S e r i e s D e p a r t m e n t o f E c o n o m i c s , O t a r u U n i v e r s i t y o f C o m m e r c e
N o . 1 - 1 6 F e b . 1 9 8 5 - O c t . 1 9 9 1
D i s c u s s i o n P a p e r S e r i e s D e p a r t m e n t o f C o m m e r c e , O t a r u U n i v e r s i t y o f C o m m e r c e
N o . 1 - 2 A p r . 1 9 8 5 - M a y 1 9 8 9
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